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JUSTICE HELD HOSTAGE: U.S. 
DISREGARD FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN THE WORLD WAR II INTERNMENT 
OF JAPANESE PERUVIANS-A CASE 
STUDY 
NATSU TAYLOR SAITO* 
INTRODUCTION: MOCHIZUKI V. UNITED STATES 
The federal government will pay $5,000 settlements and, issue an 
apology to Japanese who were taken from their homes in Latin 
America and held in U.S. internment camps during World War 
II, a Justice Department official said Thursday. 
More than 2,200 Latin Americans, most of them of Japanese 
ancestry and a majority from Peru, forcibly were brought to the 
United States during the war. 
After Pearl Harbor was bombed, the U.S. government, hoping to 
use Japanese Latin Americans as exchange prisoners for u.s. 
POWs, collaborated with the Peruvian government and other Cen-
tral and South American countries to round them up and ship 
them to the United States . ... During the war, an estimated 550 
Latin American Japanese were sent to Japan in exchange for u.s. 
POWs. lVhen the war was over, 900 more were deported to Japan, 
even though they didn't want to go. 
Neither the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
nor later administrations gave an official explanation for the 
removals and internments. 
The suit, filed in a Los Angeles federal court in 1996, sought 
equal treatment with Japanese American internees. The 1988 
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federal reparations law covered only japanese who were either US. 
citizens or legal US. residents at the time of their detention. 
-San Francisco Examiner, June 12, 1998 1 
With a weakly worded statement of regret2 and some redistribu-
tion of funds already allocated to interned Japanese Americans,3 these 
egregious violations of human rights and international law committed 
by the United States during World War II may pass into history without 
redress of the injuries, recognition of the costs or acknowledgment of 
the illegality of kidnapping civilians from a nonbelligerent third coun-
try and holding them as hostages for exchange. The settlement4 in 
Mochizuki v. United States,S a class action brought on behalf of interned 
1 $5,000, Apology to WlVll Captives EthnicJapanese from Latin America Were Locked Up in U.S. 
Camps, S.F. EXAMINER, June 12, 1998, at A5. 
2 Clinton's brief letter of apology acknowledges U.S. authorities "unjustly interned, evacll-
ated, relocated or otherwise deprived you of liberty." The letter states: 
We recognize the wrongs of the past and offer our profound regrets to those who 
endured such grave injustice. We understand t1lat our nation's actions were rooted 
in racial prejudice and wartime hysteria, and we must learn from the past and 
dedicate onrseh'es ... to renewing and strengthening equality, justice and freedom. 
Jean-Loup Sense, US Settles with Wartime LatAm Ethnic Japanese Deported to US Camps, AGENCE 
FR.-PREssE,June 13, 1998, amilable in 1998 WL 2301858. 
3 I use the term 'Japanese American" to refer to all persons of Japanese descent who had 
made their homes in the United States. This includes the Issei (first generation immigrants) who 
were still Japanese citizens as well as the Nisei (second generation) who were U.S. citizens by 
birth in the United States. Although the Issei were for the most part permanent residents who 
had every intention of living here the rest of their lives and raising their children as Americans, 
they were preyented from becoming naturalized citizens by the racial restrictions dating back to 
the Naturalization Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 103 (limiting naturalized citizenship to "free white per-
sons"). The racial restrictions were not removed until 1952 by the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, chapter 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). See generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996). 
4 The case was transferred from the Central District of California to the Federal Claims Court 
in 'vVashington, D.C. The government and the plaintiffs have entered into a Settlement Agree-
ment, which was approved on January 25, 1999. See Settlement Agreement, Mochizuki v. United 
States, No. 97-924C, 1999 WL 72777 (Fed. CI.Jan. 25, 1999); Notice of Proposed Settlement in Class 
Action Lawsuit Involving Latin American Japanese <http://www.usoj.gov/crt/ora/news.html> 
(visited Mar. 8, 1999); see also K. Connie Kang, The Battle Rages on Rights: Activist Worked Hard 
to Get Reparations for Japanese Latin American Internees, But Now Faults Notification Effort and 
Government's Different Treatment of u.s. Residents, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998, at B2; Dara Akiko 
Tom, Deadline for wn7I Redress iV/oney, AP, Aug. 10, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6706271 (noting 
plaintiff Art Shibayama's intent to "reject the payment out of principle"); Dara Akiko Tom, WWII 
Internees React to Settlement, AP, June 13, 1998, avaiklble in 1998 WL 6680095; Editorial, A Alass 
Kidnapping, WASH. POST, June 16, 1998, at A20. 
Now that the Settlement Agreement has been approyed, some of the plaintiffs have opted 
out and brought separate lawsuits. See Paul Harrington, Japanese Latin Americans Seek Redress for 
Internment ill U.S., WALL ST. j., Sept. 22, 1998, at 89; Peruvian of Japanese Origin Demands 
Compensation ftvm US, AGENCE FR.- PRESSE, Mar. 3, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2556271. 
5No. 97-924C, 41 Fed. CI. 54 (1998). 
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Japanese Latin Americans,6 is most notable for what it does not offer. 
The plaintiffs lost homes and possessions; some were forced to clear 
jungle in the Canal Zone; and men, women and children were trans-
ported under armed guard to prison camps in the Texas desert where 
they were incarcerated indefinitely without charge or hearing. Families 
were torn apart and scattered across the globe.7 Held as hostages, some 
Japanese Latin Americans were exchanged for V.S. citizens, and others 
were imprisoned past the end of the war, when the V.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service ("INS") declared them to be "illegal aliens" 
and deported them, against their will, to Japan.s There has been no 
calculation of what would constitute actual redress for the damages 
incurred. 
Whether the settlement prmides even symbolic redress is ques-
tionable. The $20,000 offered to each Japanese American9 internee 
under the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 ("CLA")]() does not compensate 
for the property lost, rights denied or il1iuries suffered as a result of 
the internment.]J The payment, instead, symbolizes this country's rec-
ognition of the injustices inflicted upon Japanese Americans during 
World War II. The CLA restricts compensation to those who were V.S. 
citizens or permanent residents at the time of the internment, thus 
excluding interned Japanese Latin Americans. The Mochizuki settle-
ment neither expands the terms of the CLA to incorporate the Japa-
6 I use the term 'Japanese Latin Americans" to refer to all persons of japanese ancestry who 
are or were living in Mexico or Central or South America. Like the japanese Americans, many 
of the first generation were still japanese citizens, but a considerable number had become 
naturalized citizens, and a significant number were citizens of their Latin American country by 
birth. 
7 See generally JOHN EMMERSON, THE JAPANESE THREAD: A LIFE IN THE U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE 
125-49 (1978); C. HARVEY GARDINER, PAWNS IN A TRIANGLE OF HATE: THE PERUVIAN JAPANESE 
AND THE UNITED STATES (1981); HIGASHIDE SEIICHI, ADIOS TO TEARS: MEMOIRS OF A JAPANESE 
PERUVIAN INTERNEE IN U.S. CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1994); Ken Mochizuki, Crystal Cit)': FOIgot-
ten World War II Camp, NORTHWEST NIKKEI, Apr. 29, 1997, at I, available in 1997 WL 11711778; 
Corey Takahashi, The Other Japanese American Internment, AsiAN MAG.: INSIDE ASIAN AM., Sept. 
30, 1997, at 40, available in 1997 WL 11551858; julie Tamaki, An Enduring Indignity; Japanese 
Latin Americans Interned During War Still Seek Redress, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1997, at B1. 
8 See infra notes 130-41 and accompanying text. 
9 japanese American, see supra note 3, not to be confused with japanese Latin American, 
see supra note 6. 
10 Civil Liberties Act ofl988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U .S.c. § 1989 
(1988». 
II This can be conu-asted, for example, with indemnification from the Federal Republic of 
Germany to Nazi victims which, according to Weglyn, included calculations for loss of life, damage 
to health, incarceration in concentration camps and ghettos, damage to propert\', damage to 
profession, repatriation and interruption of education. See MICHl \\'EGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA's CONCENTRATION CAMPS 276--77 (1996). There has been no calcu-
lation of what would constitute actual redress for the damages incurred. 
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nese Latin Americans,12 nor provides for compensation comparable to 
that received by Japanese Americans. Instead, under the settlement, 
paymen ts of $5000 will be made from monies remaining after all of the 
claims of Japanese Americans have been paid. Thus, even this reduced 
amount is not guaranteed to every internee. 13 Under such terms, it is 
hard to say whether the settlement constitutes acknowledgment and 
apology or symbolizes disrespect for the harm suffered by the Japanese 
Latin American claimants. 
Most importantly, the settlement does not acknowledge that the 
United States violated any domestic or international law by interning 
Japanese Latin Americans. H While the precedent set by Korematsu v. 
United States l5 has never been overturned,lt> it is widely accepted that 
the incarceration of Japanese Americans from the West Coast violated 
the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens and permanent residents. The 
terms of the Mochizuki settlement imply that the harm inflicted on 
Japanese Latin Americans, because they were nonresident aliens, was 
less significant than that inflicted upon Japanese Americans. Unac-
knowledged are the gross violations of international law committed in 
their kidnapping and deportation, imprisonment without hearing or 
12 The plaintiffs have asserted that this should be done by declaring them "permanent 
residents under color of law." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss at 9-12, l'vlochizuki v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 54 (1998) (No. 97-924C) (on file with 
author); see also il/fta notes 245-49 and accompanying text. 
13 The Campaign for Justice, which has organized the redress campaign for Japanese Latin 
Americans, estimates that there may be as many as 1800 claimants but funding available for far 
fewer. President Clinton has stated that "[ilf the fund proves insufficient, I will work with the 
Congress to enact legislation appropriating the necessary resources to ensure that all eligible 
claimants can obtain the compensation provided by this settlement," but this is not part of the 
settlement itself. See Jerry Seper, Government to Settle with Interned Japanese, WASH. TIMES, June 
13, 1998, at A3. An editorial in the Sacramento Bee referred to the settlement as "bargain 
basement redress." Editorial, Bargain Basement Redress; Cheers & Jeers, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 
22, 1998, at B4. 
l-l According to the Settlement Agreement, the United States maintains that the claimants 
are not eligible for redress under the CL\ and their Fifth Amendment equal protection claims 
are unfounded. The parties agree that the Settlement Agreement "shall not operate as an 
admission on the part of any pany for any purpose" and that nothing introduced in connection 
with the Agreement shall be construed as "evidence of liability or as an admission or concession." 
Settlement Agreement, 1: 21, Mochizuki v. United States, No. 97-924C, 1999 WL 72777 (Fed. CI. 
Jan. 25, 1999). Further, acceptance of payment under the Agreement is agreed to be "in full 
satisfaction of any and all claims against the United States relating to the internment of the class 
member." Id. 1: 23. 
15 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
ltl Fred Korematsu's conviction was vacated by the United States District Coun for the 
Northern District of California, but this did not overturn the Supreme Coun precedent. See 
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see also infra note 227 and 
accompanying text. 
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. charge, use as hostages for exchange and subsequent forced "repatria-
tion."17 If the Mochizuki settlement is the only U.S. acknowledgment of 
these actions, its central message may be that the U.S. government can 
disregard international law and violate human rights with impunity. 
This Article examines the abduction and incarceration of the 
Japanese Peruvians by the U.S. government from the perspective of 
international law-the provisions of international law that were vio-
lated during the war, and those that apply to the government's con-
tinuing refusal to compensate the victims. This case illustrates the 
importance of insisting that our government's foreign policy and war-
time conduct comply with international law and the costs of failing to 
incorporate international law into U.S. litigation strategies and legal 
structures. The story of the U.S. collaboration with the Peruvian gov-
ernment to kidnap and hold hostage their citizens and residents of 
Japanese descent comprises Part I. This story is presented in some 
detail, and relies heavily on contemporaneous accounts from within 
the State Department, because it is important to understand how 
international law is, in fact, implemented-or ignored-in specific 
situations. Part II reviews the provisions of international law violated 
by these actions and concludes that they were, indeed, war crimes. Part 
III considers the redress currently available in U.S. courts for these 
violations of human rights. Given that neither Congress nor the Su-
preme Court has declared the Japanese American internment illegal 
or unconstitutional, the Japanese Latin Americans have few legal reme-
dies available to them unless international law is applied. This is why 
the government could insist on such a meager settlement in tlle Mo-
chizuki case. Part IV reviews the limited options available for bringing 
these international law claims in domestic and/or international tribu-
nals. Part V considers the harm done by allowing the U.S. government 
to ignore international law in this situation, and suggests ways to better 
incorporate international law into our legal system and gm'ernmental 
institutions. The final part concludes that the internment of the Japa-
nese Latin Americans and the inadequacies of the settlement in Mo-
chizuki illustrate the importance of insisting that our government and 
our courts comply with international law. 
\7 "Repatriation" is not a particularly appropriate term here, as some of the people sent to 
Japan were not Japanese citizens and others had left long ago with no intent of returning. In 
either case most did not want to go to Japan. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text. 
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I. CIVILIANS HELD HOSTAGE: 1941-47 
I cannot begin . .. even to call the role of our maimed, mutilated, 
and missing civil liberties, but the United States, more than two 
years after the war, is holding in internment some 293 naturalized 
Peruvians of Japanese descent, who were taken by force by our State 
and Justice Departments from their homes in Peru. 
-Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, December 194718 
A. The Japanese in Peru 
Shortly after the restoration of the Meiji emperor in 1868, Japan 
began a rapid industrialization. 19 One result was that the population 
"doubled to 60 million within a little over a half century ... and rural 
Japan, already saturated with people ... , became a seemingly inex-
haustible reservoir for cheap urban labor."~() With farms too small to 
divide among children, there was considerable pressure on second and 
third sons to migrate to the cities or overseas.21 This, combined with 
"unsettling economic prospects in the wake of the Sino:Japanese War 
[and] the desire of certain shipping companies and emigration agents 
to make a profit,"22 resulted in significant Japanese emigration to the 
Americas. 
In 1899 the Sakura Maru brought the first 790 Japanese immi-
grants to Peru, landing in the port of Callao, just outside Lima. 23 Peru 
welcomed Japanese labor, especially to its expanding cotton and sugar 
plantations.24 Rural contract laborers eventually leased land for them-
ISWEGLYN, supra note 11, at 65 (quoting Town lHeeting of the Air (broadcast, Dec. 2, 1947)). 
Many of these japanese Permlans \,"ere naturalized or natiye-born PenlYian citizens, but of course, 
many were also japanese citizens. Harold Ickes was the father of Raymond Ickes, who had been 
sent to Lima by the justice Department to participate in the creation of U.S. lists of proposed 
japanese Peruvian internees, and he was also the only senior official in the Roosevelt administra-
tion to speak out against the post-war deportation of japanese Latin Americans. 
19 See generally JOHN WHITNEY HALL, JAPAN: FROM PREHISTORY TO MODERN TIMES 243-93 
(l982);jON HALLIDAY, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF JAPANESE CAPITALISM 18-19 (1975); EDWIN O. 
REISCHAUER, JAPAN: THE STORY OF A NATION 113-78 (1970). 
20 REISCHAUER, supra note 19, at 153. 
21 According to Reischauer, "(sJince there was little unused land ... and the average size of 
a farm ... was only 212 acres, the increased rural population had to drain off to the cities, but 
the new industries could not grow fast enough to absorb it all." Id. 
22 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 3. 
23 See id. According to Emmerson, they were "all destined for the coastal sugar plantations." 
EMMERSON, supra note 7, at 130. 
2~ By 1923, when labor contracts were abolished, emigration companies had brought 17,764 
japanese workers to Pel'll and in the following years japanese workers continued to migrate 
independently. See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 4. 
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selves or moved to the cities, where they became household servants, 
accumulated some capital and eventually opened barber shops, gro-
cery stores, restaurants and other commercial ventures. According to 
Harvey Gardiner, by 1938, "organizations of merchants, cafe own-
ers, barbers, bazaar owners, charcoal dealers, chauffeurs, importers, 
jewelers, hotel owners, restaura[n] teurs, peddlers, bakery owners, and 
building contractors ... boasted 967 members."25 
The success of the Japanese immigrants generated resentment 
that, intensified by the depression of the 1 930s, led to an "official 
government program to 'Permianize' economic activity aimed princi-
pally at eliminating Japanese interests and enterprises. "21; This was 
followed by the denunciation of Peru's treaty of friendship, commerce 
and navigation with Japan; the establishment of quotas requiring that 
eighty percent of any work force be nath'e Peruvian; the suspension of 
naturalizations and the annulment of late birth registrations of Japa-
nese Peruvians.27 Fueled by these trends, in May 1940 about 600 Japa-
nese homes and businesses in Lima and Callao were attacked and 
100ted.28 Despite such tensions most Japanese Peruvians were, by this 
time, deeply rooted in Peru, and the 1940 census reported 17,598 
Japanese immigrants and 8790 Peruvians citizens of Japanese descent,29 
at least forty percent of whom were women and children.30 
B. Abduction and Deportation 
A Conference of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics 
convened in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942. At the urging of the 
United States, its Final Act included detailed recommendations con-
cerning subversive acthities and the "control of dangerous aliens. "31 
25Id. at 6. John Emmerson, Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Lima, reported that by 
the early 1940s Japanese entrepreneurs controlled large percentages of the barber shops, baker-
ies, poultry farms, machine shops and glass dealers. They made most of the buses in Lima; ,,'ere 
"prominent" in the manufacture of rubber products, hosiery and hats; ,,'ere known as the best 
plumbers, carpenters and florists; and produced 12.5% of Peru's cotton. See EMMERSON, supra 
note 7, at 133. 
26 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 8. 
27 See id. 
28 See EMMERSON, supra note 7, at 134; see also GARDINER, supra note 7, at 9. 
29 See EMMERSON, supra note 7, at 131. There had been, ho,,'e\'er, a net decrease in the 
Japanese Perm'ian population through the 1930s. See id. at 130. 
30 According to Gardiner, women and children composed 40% of the Japanese communit),. 
See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 10. Emmerson states that "more than half of the Japanese 
population was female." EMMERSON, supra note 7, at 136. 
31 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 16-17 (citing The nar: Thild i'Heeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the American &publics, DEP'T ST. BULL., 1942, at 128-30). 
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The Conference established an Emergency Committee for Political 
Defense to "coordinate hemispheric security. "32 One of the Commit-
tee's resolutions, entitled Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Axis 
Nationals, advocated the "[i]nternment of dangerous Axis agents and 
nationals for the duration of the emergency. "33 While supporting repa-
triation of such persons, it advocated internment and suggested a 
program of local detention within each republic, supplemented by 
expulsion to other American republics for the duration of the war.34 
The United States agreed to pay for transportation and detention and 
promised to include nationals of the participating countries in any 
exchanges made with Axis governments. 35 Over a dozen Latin Ameri-
can countries sent internees to the United States and three countries 
set up their own detention programs.36 
Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department had been pressuring the 
American republics to send "potentially dangerous" persons, especially 
Japanese, to the United States. An October 1941 memorandum from 
the U.S. Ambassador to Panama to the Secretary of State described 
Panama's willingness to cooperate with the following plan: 
Immediately following action by the United States to intern 
Japanese in the United States, Panama would arrest Japanese 
on Panamanian territory and intern them on Taboga Island 
.... All expenses and costs of internment and guarding to 
be paid by the United States. The United States Government 
would agree to hold Panama harmless against any claims 
which might arise as a result of internment.37 
Similar proposals were enthusiastically received by the Peruvian 
government which was, by then, eager to deport its residents and even 
citizens of Japanese ancestry. On December 8, 1941 Peru froze all 
32Id. at 17. Between April 1942 and July 1943 this Committee submitted 21 programs of 
action to the governments of the "Western Hemisphere. See id. 
33Id. at 18. 
34 See id. (citing the Emergency Committee's Annual Report (July 1943) and the Emergency 
Committee's Second Annual Report (1944)); see also WEGLYN, supra note 11, at 59. 
35 See\\'EGLYN, supra note 11, at 59. The shipping was handled by the Special War Problems 
Division of the State Department, using U.S. Army transports. 
30 See id. 
37Id. at 58 (quoting Letter from Edwin Wilson, to Sumner Welles (Oct. 20, 1941) (Dept. of 
State File 740.00115 Pacific War/ll/3, RC 59, National Archives ("NA")) (on file with author)). 
As early as December 8,1941, U.S. representath"es in Costa Rica wired the State Department that 
"[o]rders for internment of all Japanese in Costa Rica have been issued." [d. at 58 (quoting 
Telegram #375 from Lane, to State Department (Dec. 8, 1941) (DS File 740.00115 Pacific War/9, 
RC 59, NA) (011 file with author)). 
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Japanese funds38 and on December 9 the United States added Japanese 
to its Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals,39 an economic black-
list which soon included 566 Japanese Perm'ian businesses.{(J The Pe-
ruvian government severed diplomatic relations with Japan in January 
1942,41 but did not declare war until 1945 when Allied victory was 
imminent.42 John Emmerson was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Lima 
from April 1942 untilJuly 1943, where, as the Embassy's only Japanese 
speaker, he studied the Japanese community and oversaw the deten-
tion and transport of Japanese Peruvians to the United States.4:l He 
summarized the situation: 
To the Peruvians, the war was a faraway fire. Not directly 
involved, although pro-Allies in sentiment, they set about to 
enjoy the advantages, and these included war on the Axis 
economic stake. The measures taken against Axis nationals 
... were welcomed for their destruction of unwanted compe-
tition .... 
Pressured by American authorities, the Peruvians zealously 
imposed controls on the movements and activities of Ger-
mans and Japanese .... All Japanese schools, organizations, 
and newspapers were closed, and Japanese were frequently 
arrested for illegal assembly ... [and] were prohibited from 
traveling . . . .44 
In early 1942, the United States proposed repatriating all Axis 
government officials from the Latin American republics through the 
United States, ignoring Peru's request to take in addition "Axis non-
official women and children and men not of military age or known to 
have engaged in subversive activities. "45 vVhen the Japanese govern-
ment insisted that ten Japanese trading company representatives be 
38 See EMMERSON, supra note 7, at 138. 
39 See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 14-15. 
40 See EMMERSON, supra note 7, at 138. 
41 See id. at 126. 
42 See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 109. 
43 See EMMERSON, supra note 7, at 139. 
441d. at 137-38 (emphasis added). These and other measures are outlined in Emmerson's 
Memorandum on the Control of Japanese in Peru. See Enclosure no. 1 to Dispatch no. 7288 from 
Henry R. Norweb, U.S. Ambassador to Peru, to SllInner Welles, U.S. Secretary of State (Mar. 24, 
1942) (740.00115 Pacific War /1706, RG 59, NA) (on file \I'ith author) [hereinafter Memorandum 
from Henry R. Norweb, Mar. 24, 1942]. 
45 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 19 (quoting Memorandum from Henry R. Norweb, Mar. 24, 
1942, supra note 44, on which Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long penciled "ignore 
this ... in replying"). 
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repatriated as well, Peru began a list of nonofficial Axis nationals it 
wished to expel, a list that quickly grew to several hundred. 46 
Aware of Peruvian President Prado's desire to expel all the Japa-
nese from Peru, the United States, in March 1942, agreed to take some 
"nonofficial Axis nationals."47 In July of 1942, Ambassador Norweb 
wrote, "[iJn any arrangement that might be made for internment of 
Japanese in the States, Peru would like to be sure that these Japanese 
would not be returned to Peru later on. The President's goal appar-
ently is the substantial elimination of the Japanese colony in Peru. "48 
The State Department was willing to help: "The suggestion thatJapa-
nese be removed from strategic areas should be followed . . . . The 
suggestion that Japanese be expelled whether they are naturalized 
Peruvians or not might be met by a denaturalization law. "49 
The first ship of civilian deportees left Callao in April 1942, car-
rying Germans, Japanese and Italians. Most of the Japanese had "vol-
unteered" by notifying the Spanish embassy in Lima that they were 
willing to repatriate to Japan.5U Even so, the process was a haphazard 
one. Peruvian authorities gave the U.S. embassy a "final and definitive" 
list, yet thirty-two men failed to appear and twelve who were not listed 
showed Up.51 Almost none of these men had been blacklisted or iden-
tified as "dangerous." According to one commentator, 
.Jtild. at 19 . 
.J7 Id. at 23 (quoting Memorandum from Henry R. Norweb, Mar. 24, 1942, supra note 44) . 
.JHWEGLYN, supra note 11, at 60 (quoting Letter from Henry R. Norweb, U.S. Ambassador 
to Peru, to SlIlllner Welles, U.S. Secretary of State (July 20, 1942) (DS File 740.00115 Pacific 
War/1002 2/6, RG 59, NA) (on file with author)) . 
.J9 Id. at 61 (quoting Memorandum from Philip W. Bonsai, to Selden Chapin (Sept. 26,1942) 
(SD File 740.00115 Pacific War/1002 5/6, RG 59, NA) (on file with author)). 
A December 1942 Intelligence Report from the Naval Attache in Lima reflects this disregard 
for the law: "One of the most encouraging phases of this limited exodus of undesirable Axis 
nationals is that no attention was paid to the fact that one of the Germans was a naturalized 
Peruvian and two were married to Peruvian women." DEPT. OF THE NAVY, Intelligence Report, Dec. 
20, 1942 (on file with author). 
Denaturalization and even the stripping of citizenship of U.S.-born Americans was consid-
ered as well. In a memorandum to Secretary of State Cordell Hull dated December 17, 1943, 
Assistant Secretary Breckinridge Long stated, "the Attorney General is reported to have said 
recently to one of the [Senate] Committees that he had a formula under one of our statutes by 
which a native-born Japanese or one naturalized could be divested of his American citizenship-
thus making him eligible for deportation." WEGLYN, supra note II, at 190. 
50 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 25; see also E~IMERSON, supra note 7, at 139. The Spanish 
embassy was used because Spain represented Japanese interests in Pent. It seems inappropriate 
to term this '\'oluntary" in light of the unremitting increase in governmental repression of the 
Japanese in Peru. It also should be noted that these men were volunteering for immediate 
repatriation, not indefinite incarceration in prison camps in the Texas desert. It is similarly 
inappropriate to term "voluntary" the departure of women and children who left to join husbands 
and fathers who had been abducted. 
51 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 27. 
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In addition to the sloppy, incomplete lists, spur-of-the-mo-
ment additions and subtractions, quixotic and erratic inspec-
tions, and the lack of coordination between the Peruvian and 
American authorities, this first deportation operation exhib-
ited no recognizable criteria for deportation. Almost all the 
men lacked social, economic, and community significance.52 
285 
U.S. embassy official Emmerson states that "[o]n subsequent sail-
ings, no volunteers were accepted. The object of the program was 
to expel those enemy aliens whose continued presence in the coun-
try presented a danger to the hemisphere's security. "~3 While that 
may have been the objective, that was not the criterion used. Em-
merson admits: 
In selecting the deportees, since no proof of guilt existed, it 
seemed logical to mark for detention those individuals who 
by their influence or position in the community, their known 
or suspected connections inJapan, or by their manifest loyalty 
to Japan could be considered potential subversives .... Since 
no one in the Peruvian government or in the embassy, except 
myself, spoke or read Japanese, [researching the activities of 
the Japanese Peruvians] fell largely to me. 54 
Emmerson, just transferred to Peru, thus became the only repre-
sentative of the U.S. government with any specific information 
about the Japanese Peruvians who were to be interned. Struggling 
to read letters brought to him by the Peruvian police, he "failed to 
find a single missive which divulged bomb plots, secret trysts, con-
templated assassinations, codes, or even plans to signal a Japanese 
ship from a lonely beach. Nothing emerged to confirm the rumors 
constantly whispered to our legal, army, and naval attaches by their 
conscientious paid informants."55 Traveling throughout the country 
and gathering information about the various Japanese communities 
likewise revealed "nothing reliable or convincing about subver-
sion. "56 It is hard to escape Harvey Gardiner's conclusion: "The 
Americans, ignoring both law and legal formality, simply wanted to 
weaken the Japanese community by seizing and expelling its lead-
ers."57 
52Id. at 28. 
53 EMMERSON, supra note 7, at 139. 
54Id. 
55/d. at 140. 
56Id. at 143. 
57 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 41. 
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The lack of evidence regarding subversive activity did not slow 
down the expulsion and internment of Japanese Peruvians. The State 
Department knew that those on U.S. lists had not been identified as 
dangerous and that most of the Japanese arrested by Peruvian authori-
ties had no connection to either the war effort or the lists prepared by 
the United States. As Emmerson notes: 
Lacking incriminating evidence, we established the criteria of 
leadership and influence in the community to determine 
those Japanese to be expelled. We prepared lists, which we 
presented to the Peruvian authorities. These authorities, com-
mitted at least personally if not officially, to the expulsion of 
all Japanese, treated our proposed lists rather lightly. As the 
second and third ships departed, it became clear that the 
passengers who actually embarked were not the ones so care-
fully identified by US. 58 
The Peruvian police arrested Japanese men without warning, 
often in pre-dawn raids on their homes. In many cases the men were 
given no time to gather personal items or notify their families. They 
were generally held in local jails, then turned over to U.S. authorities. 
No charges were filed; no hearings held. To avoid arrest, some men 
went into hiding; others found that well-placed bribes could buy them 
time.59 Most of the men were Japanese nationals, but citizenship made 
little, if any, difference. Naturalized and native-born Peruvian citizens 
of Japanese descent were arrested and deported as well. Many who 
were Japanese citizens had lived in Peru for decades, some for over 
forty years,60 and a number had wives and children who were Peruvian 
citizens. For "humanitarian reasons" and, one might note, to maximize 
the number of internees, U.S. officials included wives and children as 
"voluntary deportees."61 For many women, joining their husbands in 
the United States was preferable to trying to raise children alone in a 
hostile environment, with the wage earners gone, businesses closed 
and assets frozen. Even in this sense, some departures could not be 
termed voluntary. A "strictly confidential" memorandum from the First 
Secretary of the Embassy in Lima to the Secretary of State notes that 
Chieko Nishino was deported upon the order of the Peruvian Minister 
of Government despite her insistence that she did not wish to join her 
estranged husband (indeed, despite her threats to commit suicide 
5» E,IMERSON, supm note 7, at 143. 
5~ See id. at 143-44; GARDINER, supra note 7, at 65-67; WEGLYN, supra note 11, at 61. 
GO See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 43. 
,;[ !d. 
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should she be deported) because the embassy feared that refusal to 
take her "might jeopardize future deportations of Axis nationals. "62 
In February 1943 168 Japanese and 5 Germans were driven 600 
miles north in army trucks without provisions for food to the port of 
Talara.u3 From Talara the men were sent to the Panama Canal Zone, 
where they lived under armed guard for several weeks, forced to clear 
jungle and construct living quarters. 64 They were then put on a U.S. 
army transport, where they were again required to work without pay.6;' 
When the ship docked at San Pedro, California, INS officials asked 
each man if he had a passport. None did, as all passports-Japanese 
and Peruvian-had been taken by U.S. authorities as soon as the ship 
left Peruvian waters.56 Ironically, the Japanese Peruvians who had just 
been abducted at the behest of the State Department were informed 
by INS officials that their entry into the United States was "illegal."G7 
This Kafkaesque sleight of hand foreshadowed the problems thatJapa-
nese Latin American internees would face both at the end of the war 
and when applying for reparations under the Civil Liberties Act of 
1988. 
Meanwhile, Peruvian President Prado sought U.S. help in perma-
nently removing all Permians of Japanese descent.u8 Countering legal 
62 Letter from George H. Butler, First Secretary of Embassy, to the Secretary of State (July 
10, 1943) (OS File 740.00115 Pacific War/ 1729, RG 59) (on file with author). U.S. officials forced 
Mrs. Nishino onto an army transport and sent her to a prison camp in the United States while, 
at the same time, sending a memorandum to the Spanish Embassy, which represented Japanese 
interests, "disclaim [ing] all responsibility for any untoward incident which may occur during Mrs. 
Nishino's stay in the United States ... or during the voyage." Memorandum from Henry R. 
Norweb, U.S. Ambassador to Peru, to Pablo de Churruca y Dotes, Spanish Ambassador to Peru 
(July 17, 1943) (OS File 740.00115, Pacific War/l 729, RG 59) (on file with author). 
63 See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 67-69. 
64 Before they got there, however, this group spent over three months clearing jungle in 
Panama: 
[Als the rains beat down, the men were forced to work without remuneration. 
Denied communication with their families, unaccustomed to the hard labor, resent-
ing the unsavory food and their inadequate shelter under intolerable ,,'eather 
conditions, the men understandably put forth no special effort. In return guards 
occasionally kicked, beat, or nicked with their bayonets some passive worker. 
[d. at 76. 
Gardiner reports that a thirty-one yeat"Old merchant became so distraught that one day he 
began running for freedom, barefoot and in his pajamas. Miraculously he sun'h'ed after guards 
in the towers felled him with their machine guns. See id. <It 77. 
65 See id. at 69. Gardiner reports that one n1<1n was incarcerated for insubordination "'hen 
he refused to work and that all of the men "'ere forced to sign papers stating that they had been 
well treated on board. See id. 
66 See id. at 69-70. They did not ha\'e visas either, as U.S. consular officials had been instructed 
not to issue any. See id. at 29. 
67 See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 70. 
G8 According to Gardinet; "[h]e and Pedro Beltran [later Peruvian ambassador to the United 
288 40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 275 [Symposium 
concerns about shipping the Japanese Peruvians from a nonbelligerent 
state to a belligerent one, Prado argued that such action was permissi-
ble for purposes of repatriation. 69 This, of course, would only have been 
true for those Japanese citizens who requested repatriation. 70 U.S. Am-
bassador Norweb initially recommended that only "dangerous" Japa-
nese leaders be expelled, but he wanted to maintain good relations 
with the Peruvian government and eventually advocated the removal 
of all Japanese Peruvians to the United States, regardless of their 
citizenship. "While approving Norweb's ... proposals, the [State] de-
partment did view the deportation of Nisei [second generation] and 
naturalized Japanese as a knotty problem and suggested that the latter 
be 'denaturalized.' "71 
In August 1942 Secretary of State Hull proposed to President 
Roosevelt that the State Department "[c]ontinue our efforts to remove 
all theJapanesefrom these American Republic countries for internment 
in the United States [and] continue our efforts to remove from South 
and Central America all the dangerous Germans and Italians still there 
•.•• "72 In other words, the State Department intended to individually 
screen Germans and Italians to see if they were dangerous, while simply 
kidnapping the Japanese wholesale. This created tension between the 
Departments of State and Justice, as the Justice Department knew that 
the only plausible justification for deporting and interning Japanese 
Peruvians was their identification as enemy aliens who posed a sig-
nificant danger to hemispheric security. In June 1942 Attorney General 
Francis Biddle took the position that: 
[i]f [the Latin American internees] are not to be repatriated 
... , the Department of State should arrange for them to be 
returned to Central or South America or the same procedure 
should be adopted with respect to them as now applies to 
other Axis aliens apprehended in this country on Presidential 
warrants, and [] each case should be decided on its merits to 
determine, after proper hearing, whether the individual alien 
should be released, paroled, or interned for the duration.73 
States] agreed that the removal of 30,000 Japanese they claimed were in the country would be 
the most welcome aid Washington could render Peru." rd. at 53. 
ti9 See id. at 53. 
70 See inft'a notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
71 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 55. 
72WEGLYN, supra note 11, at 63 (quoting letter from Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State, 
to Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President (Aug. 27, 1942) (OF 20, FDR Library) (on file with 
author) (emphasis added)). 
73 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 56 (quoting Memorandum from Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney 
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The State Department favored repatriation or deportation to Ja-
pan,74 but the Attorney General hesitated, noting that "[a] ny invol-
untary repatriation appears to raise serious questions of law as well 
as of policy. "75 
By January 1943 the Justice Department could no longer ignore 
the fact that the United States was interning people who neither posed 
a security threat nor, as Peruvian citizens, were even enemy aliens. 
Although not insisting on individual hearings before alien enemy re-
view boards, Biddle declared that "[slome of the cases seem to be 
mistakes,"76 and sent Raymond Ickes of the Justice Department's Alien 
Enemy Control Unit to Lima to review the information available on 
each detainee to determine if he was actually or potentially "danger-
ous." Ickes's review slowed the process, but failed to ensure that only 
"dangerous enemy aliens" were deported. 77 He, too, discovered that 
there was no evidence that anyone was, in fact, "dangerous." Thus, 
"[iln an effort to establish parameters warranting internment, Ickes 
accepted the following: service as an officer of a Japanese society, 
residence in Callao and other (unidentified) strategic areas, atten-
dance at Japanese meetings ... , visits at embassies and legations of 
other enemy countries. "78 The "screening" done by Emmerson for the 
State Department and Ickes for the Justice Department had little effect. 
Of the 119 men interned by the U.S. government in February 1943, 
only 15 had been on the U.S. list. 79 The rest were selected inde-
pendently, and apparently quite randomly, by Peruvian authorities. 
General, to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State (june 25, 1942) (DS File 740.00115 E\\,1939/3610, 
RG59 NA) (on file with author)). 
74 Apparently the State Department took this position because it "'as all'are that the laws of 
most of the Latin American republics would not allow them to detain Axis nationals for the 
duration of the war. See id. at 57. 
75ld. (quoting Department of State Memorandum (No\'. 6, 1942) (DS File 311.9415/251) 
and Memorandum from Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney General, to Secretary of State (No\'. 9, 
1942) (DS File 740.00115 PW/1126, GR59, NA) (on file with author)). 
76WEGLYN, supra note 11, at 63 (quoting Letter from Francis Biddle, U.S. Attorney General, 
to the Secretary of State (jan. 11, 1943) (DS 740.00115 Pacific War/1276, RG59, NA) (on file 
with author)). 
77 People like Arturo Shinei Yakabi were still among those taken on the next ship. Yakabi, 
twenty-one years old, had been born in Pel'll. As the oldest child of poor fannworkers, he had 
been sent at age 15 to work in a bakery in Callao. In February 1943 he was awakened in his room 
behind the bakery, seized by the Peruvian police and held in a Lima jail for three weeks. 
Apparently his employer had avoided deportation by paying a bribe and offering Yakabi as a 
substitute. Yakabi's mother visited repeatedly and the police told the family that if they had money 
something could be "worked out." They did not have any, so at 3:00 a.m. on February 24, carrying 
all he owned in a flour sack, Yakabi was put on a truck and loaded onto the Frederich C. Johnson. 
He joined 119 other Japanese Perm'iallS headed to concentration camps in Missouri, IV[ontana 
and latel; the Texas desert. See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 72, 77-78. 
78Id. at 73. 
79 In addition to those men who were deemed "dangerous," the United States wanted the 
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The last ship transporting Japanese Peruvians landed in New 
Orleans on October 21, 1944. By that time well over 2000 people~;u had 
been taken from their homes and their homelands and interned in 
U.S. prison camps-many of them snatched from their beds or ar-
rested without warning at work or in meetings; others "volunteering" 
to be repatriated to Japan because conditions had become so harsh in 
Peru; some "volunteering" in order to reunite their families. 
C. Internment in the United States 
The Japanese Latin American internees were held by the INS, 
under Justice Department jurisdiction, rather than by the War Reloca-
tion Authority ("WRA") that had been established to oversee the in-
carceration of Japanese Americans.8l The first INS internment cen-
ter-concentration camp, to be more accurate82-was in an abandoned 
federal Civilian Conservation Corps camp in the southern Texas town 
of Kenedy.83 There was no doubt that this was a prison camp-the 
administrators were instructed to comply with the Geneva Convention 
of 1929, which specifies minimum requirements for the treatment of 
prisoners of war.84 A censor division scrutinized all mail and a surveil-
lance department trained civilian guards to work with INS agents.85 
There were two daily line-ups and up to four checks each night. The 
entire camp was surrounded by a barbed-wire fence which, if touched, 
activated an electric alarm.86 Some Japanese Latin American men were 
sent to an abandoned army post at Fort Missoula, Montana, where 
"hundreds ofItalian seamen, a few Germans, and an unknown number 
of Japanese Americans" were already being held.87 From these camps, 
families of the men who had already been interned, as the men were more likely to agree to be 
repatriated to Japan if their families were with them. See id. at 73. 
8o\\'eglyn says of the Japanese Latin Americans in Justice Department custody: "A total of 
1,094 of them, officially designated as 'voluntary detainees,' answered the State Department's 
'invitation' to place themseh'es in war-duration "oluntary incarceration with the 1,024 men who 
had been seized and spirited to the mainland by the U.S. military." WEGLYN, supra note 11, at 
62; see also EMMERSON, supra note 7, at 139; GARDINER, supra note 7, at 95. 
81 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 22. 
82 That these, and the \\'RA camps, were in fact, concentration camps, has been acknow-
ledged by many who were responsible for them. President Roosevelt said in 1944, that "it is felt 
by a great many lawyers that under the Constitution [the Nisei] can't be kept locked lip in 
concentration camps." WEGLYN, supra note 11, at 217. Upon his retirement as Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court, Tom Clark said, "[w]e picked [the Japanese Americans] up and put them 
in concentration camps. That's the truth of the matter." ld. at 114. 
83 See G.\RDINER, supra note 7, at 29-30. 
84 See id. at 30. 
8:, See id. 
86 See id. at 32-33. 
871d. at 83. 
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some ''volunteers'' went to Kooskia, Idaho to work on road projects 
while those men who remained at Kenedy were transferred to a barbed 
wire stockade, formerly a prison, in Santa Fe, New Mexico.8R 
As more internees, particularly women and children, were 
brought in, the INS created two additional camps in Texas. One was 
at Seagoville, a former federal women's prison, where internees were 
initially housed with prison inmates under the immediate supervision 
of a Bureau of Prisons warden.89 The Seagoville prison was soon filled, 
and the INS expanded a migrant labor facility in Crystal City, Texas to 
become the third prison camp.90 Some Japanese Latin Americans were 
also held by the military at Camp Livingston, Louisiana and Fort Sill, 
Oklahoma.91 
Living conditions in these camps were abhorrent. In July 1943 
Albert Clattenberg of the State Department, after visiting the camps at 
Kenedy, Crystal City and Seagoville, noted that the physical facilities, 
except the permanent buildings at Seagoville, were significantly worse 
than those at a U.S. prisoner of war camp he had visited in Europe: 
The climate of Texas ... cannot be considered mild in sum-
mer and the shadeless detention areas in which there are 
primarily temporary structures do not measure up against the 
Texas heat in the same way that the permanent structures in 
the detention camps in Europe, even with the scarcity of fuel, 
measure up against the European winter.92 
Clattenberg worried that the poor conditions in the camps endan-
gered the well-being of Americans that were being held by Axis 
governments and warned that "our Americans in Europe stand in 
momentary danger of ruthless retaliation.''93 
In addition to the physical difficulties discussed above, the Japa-
nese Peruvians were subject to social, economic, cultural and psycho-
logical hardships as well. Families were literally scattered around the 
world, and those who managed to reunite in camp faced years in 
cramped quarters with little privacy. Property, personal belongings and 
88 See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 97-98. 
89 See id. at 37-38. 
90 See id. at 36, 75, 98-103. 
91 See id. at 49. 
92 Albert E. Clattenberg, Brief Redew of Impressions Obtained at Immigration Detention 
Stations at Kennedy, Crystal City and Seagoville, Texas (July 9, 1943) (on file with author). 
931d. He blamed the conditions on the "apparent failure of the appropriate agencies of this 
Government to accord the Immigration Service the priority ratings necessary for provision of 
material articles requisite for the construction and operation of a camp according to a standard 
affording security against I'eprisals for our Americans detained abroad." 1d. 
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cash were lost. Parents worried about their children being accepted in 
Japan and tried to retain some semblance of Japanese culture and 
language in their lives, while the children who had grown up speaking 
Spanish were now constantly exposed to English. Children born in the 
camps added to already confused questions of identity. "The Hikozo 
Izumi family," Gardiner states, "represented graphically the kinds of 
tangled citizenship to which internment was contributing. Hikozo held 
Japanese citizenship, his wife Masako was a Peruvian Nisei, one child 
was Peruvian-born, and now their second child was American."04 
D. Hostages for Exchange 
Why did the United States go to so much trouble and expense to 
detain, transport and incarcerate nearly 2000 Japanese Peruvians who 
were known to be of no danger to hemispheric security? 
U.S. officials may have thought that catering to anti:Japanese 
sentiment was an easy way to obtain Peru's cooperation in the war 
effort. Although the U.S. government placed a military force near the 
northern oilfields of Talara, signed a lend-lease agreement promising 
Peru approximately $29 million of arms and munitions and negotiated 
for Peruvian rubber, cinchona bark and other perceived strategic ma-
terials,95 such factors do not adequately explain the U.S. motivation in 
this massive effort to intern civilians. The U.S. authorities wanted to 
have Japanese Latin American civilians in their possession and control 
not because these civilians posed any threat but because the United 
States wanted hostages to barter for American citizens held in Japa-
nese-occupied territories. 
The idea of taking hostages was not a new one. As early as 1936, 
George S. Patton, then Chief of Military Intelligence in Hawaii, drafted 
a plan "[t]o arrest and intern certain persons of the Orange race [i.e., 
Japanese] who [were] considered most inimical to American interests, 
or those whom, due to their position and influence in the Orange 
community, it [was] desirable to retain as hostages."96 In August 1941, 
months before the U.S. Navy was attacked at Pearl Harbor, Congress-
man John Dingell of Michigan wrote President Roosevelt: 
I want to suggest ... that we remind Nippon that unless 
assurances are received that Japan will facilitate and permit 
the voluntary departure of [a group of one hundred Ameri-
94 GARDINER, supra note 7, at'llO, 
95 See id. at 20-21. 
96WEGLYN, supra note II, at 182. 
December 1998] 19 B.G. THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 275 
can citizens] within forty-eight hours, the Government of the 
United States will cause the forceful detention or imprison-
ment in a concentration camp of ten thousand alien Japanese 
in Hawaii; the ratio of Japanese hostages held by America 
being one hundred for every American detained by the Mi-
kado's Government. 
It would be well to further remind Japan that there are 
perhaps one hundred fifty thousand additional alien Japa-
nese in the United States who will be held in a reprisal reserve 
97 
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In January 1942 Major Karl Bendetson, architect of the Japanese 
American internment, said that "the 'hostage idea' has not been 
sufficiently explored .... The question should be ... whether the 
individual has any close relatives in the armed forces ... in [a) 
hostile [nation)."98 Weglyn says 
[i)f a reprisal reserve urgency had indeed precipitated the 
sudden decision for internment, the emphasis, as tlle tide of 
the war reversed itself, switched to the buildup of a "barter 
reserve": one sizable enough to allow for the earliest possible 
repatriation of American detainees, even at the price of a dis-
proportionate number of Japanese nationals in exchange.99 
All of this could have been avoided had the United States ac-
cepted aJapanese proposal in the early days of the war to exchange 
nonofficials "without limit as to their number and without question 
of their usefulness for the prosecution of the war. "IO!) Instead, the 
United States pursued a policy of creating reserves of hostages for 
exchange. As a result, according to Gardiner, 
by mid-1942 the United States, aware of the entrapment of 
additional thousands of Americans by Japanese military suc-
cesses, could only hope to regain those nonofficial Americans 
by giving up an equal number of nonofficial Japanese. Bat-
tlefield casualties did not then constitute the sole body count. 
97 [d. at 55 (quoting Letter from John Dingell, U.S. Congressman from Michigan, to Franklin 
D. Roosevelt (Aug. 18, 1941) (on file with author». As Weglyn points out, according to the 1940 
census, there were approximately 127,000 Japanese Americans in the continental United States, 
less than 50,000 of whom were aliens. See id. at 285 n.1. 
98 [d. at 182. 
99 [d. at 56. 
IOOGARDINER, supra note 7, at 47 (citations omitted). 
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Very carefully one counted and matched the number of per-
sons promised in any exchange with the enemy. \1)1 
Two such exchanges of civilians took place. 102 In an Outline of 
Negotiations for Exchange of American Civilians in Japanese Hands, Clat-
tenberg states that from December 7, 1941 to April 15, 1942 the United 
States "assembled from various points on this continent Japanese na-
tionals who were to be repatriated" and from April 15 to July 25, 1942 
"carried on the activities necessary to accumulate a ship-load of Japa-
nese nationals from this hemisphere."1IJ3 In June 1942 the Gripsholm 
left New York carrying 1065 Japanese nationals, including 35 Japanese 
Peruvians. liB The second exchange was delayed until September 1943 
by communication problems, the difficulties of working through both 
Spanish and Swiss intermediaries, discrepancies between the individu-
als requested by the Japanese government and those produced by the 
United States and the refusal of many Japanese Latin Americans to 
repatriate. This time the Gripsholm carried 1340 Japanese, of whom 
484 were from Peru. IU5 
The United States was anxious to arrange a third exchange of 
1500 prisoners, but the Japanese government's interest seems to have 
waned as it learned of the U.S. treatment of both Japanese Americans 
and Latin Americans. In October 1942 the Spanish embassy transmit-
ted a protest from the Japanese government denouncing the "inhu-
man treatment given the Japanese in Panama. "lOG A Memorandum of 
May 29, 1944 protested the transfer of both Bolivian and Peruvian 
Japanese: 
101 Id. at 50. 
1U2Within days of the U.S. declaration of war, the Japanese had accepted a U.S. proposal for 
an exchange of diplomatic personnel at the east African port of Lourenco Marques (now 
Maputo). A memorandum of June 15, 1942 outlines the agreement. See State Department 
Memorandum, Summary of Americanjapanese Exchange Agreement (June 15, 1942) (on file 
with author); see also GARDINER, supra note 7, at 46-47. 
103 Albert E. Clattenberg, Outline of Negotiations for Exchange of American Civilians in 
Japanese Hands (Oct. 12, 1943) (on file with author). 
IIHGARDINER, supra note 7, at 48. Approximately 400 additional Japanese from the east coast 
of South America were picked up in Rio de Janeiro. See id. 
105 Gardiner concludes: 
\Yhen the United States put the women and children from Costa Rica and Panama, 
the men h'om Peru, and the occasional family from any of those countries aboard 
the Gripsholm, those Latin American Japanese, not one of whom had been charged, 
tried, or convicted of espionage, sabotage, or subversive activity, were pawns in a 
human traffic ""ashington hoped to continue. 
Id. at 50. 
IiJtiMemorandum from the Spanish Embassy, to the U.S. Department of State, (Oct. 1, 1942), 
rep/inted in WEGLYN, supra note 11, at 183-84 app. 7A. According to the Spanish Embassy: 
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The fact of the American Governmen t having whimsically 
transferred the custody of Japanese residents of a third coun-
try, namely Bolivia, to the United States, is as unjust a measure 
as the one taken by the American Government with the Japa-
nese residents of Peru, a measure that the Japanese Govern-
ment is still at a loss to understand.107 
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In addition to protesting the abduction of Japanese from Central 
and South America, the Japanese government paid close attention to 
the U.S. treatment of Japanese Americans. In late 1942 Dillon Myer, 
National Director of the War Relocation Authority, notified the direc-
tors of the ten U.S. "relocation centers" that the Spanish Consul, on 
behalf of the Japanese government, was conducting inspection tours 
of all civilian detention camps. He warned: "Please bear in mind 
that the Japanese Government has recently evidenced a substantial 
amount of interest in the West Coast evacuation through diplomatic 
channels and has lodged some rather vigorous protests concerning 
various phases of the treatment of Japanese generally in the United 
States. "108 
In December 1942 dissent and turmoil at the camp holding Japa-
nese Americans in Manzanar, California culminated in troops throwing 
tear gas grenades and firing into a crowd, killing two internees and in-
juring dozens. 109 The WRA reported, "The incident, which might well 
have been represented to Japanese governmental authorities as an 
/d. 
The Japanese diplomats and residents of Panama who recently arrh'ed in Japan, 
denounce the inhuman treatment gh'en the Japanese in Panama. 
They advise that on December 7th, all Japanese residents in Panama were arrested 
without allowing them to take anything mOl'e ,dth them than what they had on. 
and were held up to 24 hours in the jail of Panama and by the Police of Colon 
without any food or water. 
On the 8th, they were turned over to the American Authorities and for one week 
were put in very unsanitary concentration camps, forced to work and given extreme 
punishment. 
Immediately after their arrest, the homes and residences of these detainees were 
looted, 
Upon being transferred, the American Authorities of the Canal Zone, confiscated 
all the money that they had .... 
Among the Japanese detainees, there was one named Alejandro who fell ill, and 
neither the American or Panamanian Authorities gm'e him medical attention until 
the 2nd of May. when he was placed in a hospital and where he died the same day. 
107 Memorandum from the Spanish Embassy, to the U,S. Department of State (May 29, 1944), 
reprinted in WEGLYN, supra note II, at 185. 
108WEGLYN, supra note 11, at 120 (quoting Memorandum from Myel' to All Project Directors 
(Dec. 9, 1942) (on file with author)). 
109 See id. at 121-25. 
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attempt at mass murder, could easily have touched off a wave of unre-
strained brutality at prisoner of war camps and detention stations 
throughout the Far East. "IJU There was no immediate response, but 
"[a]fter the docking of the first detainee exchange ship, the Japanese 
Government sharply protested 'these outrages on the part of the 
United States Authorities' in which 'unarmed civilian internees who 
offered no resistance were mercilessly killed and wounded.' "111 
Shortly after the second Gripsholm exchange, the U.S. government 
sent all the Japanese Americans deemed "disloyal" to the Tule Lake 
camp. There, 18,000 Japanese Americans were crowded into a camp 
complete with barbed wire, tanks patrolling its perimeter and a full 
battalion of guard troops.ll2 Outrage over their treatment escalated 
into a demonstration of over 5000 men, women and children when 
WRA Director Myer visited in November 1943. Three days later, the 
Army invaded and martial law was declared within the camp, triggering 
new rounds of arrests, protests and hunger strikes.ll3 The Japanese 
government protested and Secretary of State Hull immediately warned 
Secretary of War Stimson of the "vital nature of this problem arising 
from the desire of this government to keep open negotiations with the 
Japanese Government, looking toward future exchange operations 
through which Americans in Japanese hands may be repatriated 
•••• "114 Nonetheless, the U.S. government persisted in its hard line 
response. Weglyn concludes: 
The Tule Lake "riot" had exploded into headlines at the very 
moment when the lives and safety of over 6,000 American 
detainees in Japanese prison camps hung precariously in the 
balance as they awaited exchange ships. In two years of war, 
fewer than 3,000 persons had been exchanged .... 
With the follow-up report from the Spanish Embassy con-
cerning the stockade, the 200 men being held therein, and 
the extraordinary Army seizure of a camp full of civilian 
detainees, Tokyo called an abrupt halt to prisoner-exchange 
negotiations. The cutoff proved permanent. ll5 
1I0ld. at 125 (quoting \\'AR RELOCATION AUTHORITY, WRA: A STORY OF HUMAN CONSERVA-
TION 50 (1946». 
1111d. (quoting Memorandum from Spanish Embassy to State Department (Mar. 13, 1944) 
(on file with author». 
112 See id. at 156-57. 
11:1 See WEGLYN, supra note II, at 160-66. 
IH Id. at 171 (quoting Secretary of State Hull, to Secretary of War Stimson (jan. 11, 1944) 
(WRA File 36.239, RG 210, NA) (on file with author». 
115Id.atI73. 
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Thus, it seems that the U.S. kidnapping of civilians from third-party 
countries and the mistreatment in the camps of both Latin Ameri-
can and U.S. citizens or residents of Japanese descent made the 
Japanese government unwilling to participate in further exchanges. 
Although ships continued to bring deportees from Peru through 
the middle of 1944, only about 500 Japanese Peruvians, in total, 
were exchanged for Japanese-held American citizens. As of July 
1945, over 1300 Japanese Latin Americans, mostly Peruvians, re-
mained interned in the United States, along with 815 Germans and 
53 Italians who had been brought to the United States from Latin 
America. 1 16 
E. Forced Deportations 
The internment of Japanese Latin Americans, much like the in-
ternment of Japanese Americans, has been portrayed as an aberration 
based on wartime hysteria, confusion or haste.1l7 The implication is 
that the actions taken, while regrettable, were justifiable because they 
occurred under extraordinary circumstances. It is, however, precisely 
during times of war or other perceived crisis-times that our civil 
liberties are most easily lost-that we must most diligently guard our 
rights and insist on lawful conduct by the government. 1I8 That these 
violations of human rights were not just a product of wartime hysteria, 
but were deeply rooted in our political and legal structures is illustrated 
by the treatment of the Japanese Latin Americans after the war ended. 
In December 1945 Jonathan Bingham, Chief of the State Depart-
ment's Alien Enemy Control Section, stated, "[t]here was never any 
clear understanding as to the eventual disposition of the aliens after 
the war, primarily because at the time they were deported from Peru 
no one was thinking about the postwar period."l19 A full year before 
Japan's surrender, realizing that further civilian exchanges were un-
likely, the State Department anticipated "difficulties in disposing of the 
IIIiEven though they-unlike the Japanese-had been determined to be "dangerous," oyer 
half the Italians and almost a third of the Germans ,,'ere "interned at large," haying been released 
in a parole-type status after an im'estigation of their cases. All of the Japanese ,,'ere kept in camps. 
See Memorandum on the Remm'al of Enemy Aliens Brought Here from the Other Americas, from 
J.E. Doyle, to the Acting Secretary of State (Sept. 24, 1945) (on file with author). 
117 See Sense, supra note 2 (quoting apology of President Clinton); see also WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUlST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CI\'IL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 205-06, 211 (1998) (noting 
that judicial review is ill-suited to determine "military necessity" and that on the West Coast there 
was real fear of attack by Japanese forces). 
118 See Eugene V. Rostow, The japanese Allle/iean Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE LJ. 489 (1945). 
119 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 129 (quoting Memorandum of Jonathan Bingham, Chief of 
the State Department's Alien Enemy Control Section (Dec. 13, 1945), published in 9 FRUS 298 
(1945». 
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enemy nationals brought here from the other American republics for 
internment."120 The repatriation of those who wanted to return to 
Germany or Japan was not an issue, but the internees who wanted to 
return to Latin America or remain in the United States posed a prob-
lem for the government. 
U.S. officials faced a dilemma. On the one hand, they wanted the 
other American republics to agree to "the return of all internees to 
the enemy state of which they were nalionals,"121 in part because the 
State Department had a grand vision of banishing all "subversive" 
elements from the hemisphere, and perhaps also because the "more 
complete the harassment and removal of late enemy nationals and 
their operations, the more complete the economic void to be filled by 
Americans, their products and capital. "122 On the other hand, the 
Justice Department was clear that U.S. law and policy prohibited forced 
repatriations. 
At a meeting held on August 31, 1944, State Department officials 
recognized that "some individuals sent here for internment were un-
doubtedly relatively harmless and probably were selected for expulsion 
through error."123 Thus, they agreed to divide the internees into three 
classifications: (A) dangerous, (B) probably dangerous and (C) prob-
ably harmless. Persons in categories Band C might be allowed to 
return to the Latin American countries from which they came, but 
"[a]11 persons in category A would be sent to their homeland and 
efforts would be made ... to prevent them from returning to the 
Western Hemisphere. "12~ The new classification system afforded no 
relief to jap+lnese Latin Americans because it was further agreed that 
"category [A] would include allJapanesereceived from the other Amer-
ican republics" whether considered dangerous or not. 125 
In March 1945 the Inter-American Conference on Problems of 
War and Peace at Mexico City passed Resolution VII of its Final Act, 
recommending that all American republics adopt measures to prevent 
any person whose deportation was deemed necessary for reasons of se-
curity from further residing in the Western Hemisphere. 126 The United 
1~1l :'>Iemorandum of Meeting, Post-War Disposition of Interned Alien Enemies Received from 
the Other American Republics 1 (Aug. 31,1944) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum 
of l\Ieeting}. 
1~1 See id. at 2. 
lnGARDINER, supra note 7, at 114--15. 
l~JMemorandum of Meeting, supra note 120, at 2. 
l~" See id. at 4. 
125 See id. (emphasis added). By January 31, 1946, of the 513 Japanese from Latin America 
still in U.S. custody, 495 were from Peru. See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 134, tbl. 9. 
120 See Proclamation No. 2662, reprinted in 50 U.S.C., Supp. IV, app. note prec. § 1 (1945) 
alld in 59 Stat. 880 (1945). 
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States invoked Resolution VII to pressure Latin American governments 
into repatriating all interned Axis nationals. Nonetheless, Peru insisted 
that the U.S. return certain German internees to Peru, regardless of 
their security classification, and refused to take back any of the Japa-
nese, even those who were Peruvian citizens. Mter initial resistance, U.S. 
authorities agreed that Peru would have the final word on German 
deportations, despite the fact that this "would result in the return to 
Peru of some of the worst offenders .... "127 Regarding the Japanese, 
Gardiner explains, 
Peru, regretting that it had not rid itself of all its Japanese, 
insistently refused to readmit most of those who had been 
shipped to the United States. Secure in the knowledge that 
the interned Peruvian Japanese had constituted no security 
risk to either country at any time, the United States had 
hoped that Peru would relent and readmit the several hun-
dred who desired to return there. 128 
Ultimately, Peru agreed only to the return of those who were born 
in Peru (the Nisei), naturalized citizens and those who were mar-
ried to Peruvians. 129 
U.S. authorities insisted that all remaining Japanese Perudans 
would be deported to Japan, even though it was unclear that the 
government had the power to send them in\'Oluntarily. The Alien 
Enemy Act of 1798130 provided that in the event of war all enemy aliens 
over fourteen years of age within the United States could be "appre-
hended, restrained, secured, and removed" according to presidential 
proclamation. The government had relied on this authority in holding 
Japanese Latin Americans, although its application to those brought 
here by the government is questionable. 
OnJuly 14,1945 President Truman issued a proclamation author-
izing the Attorney General to order the removal of alien enemies 
interned within the United States who were deemed "dangerous to the 
public peace and safety of the United States because they have adhered 
to ... enemy governments or to the principles of government thereof 
127 See Memorandum, Disposition of German Internees from Peru, from Joseph Flack, to Mr. 
Dreier (Nov. 7, 1945) (on file with author) (with attachments gidng the history of the disagree-
ment). 
128GARDINER, supra note 7, at 152. 
129Id. at 153. 
130 Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § I., I Stat. 577 (50 U.S.c. § 21 et seq.{l998)); see also J. Gregory 
Sidak, War, Liberty and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1402, 1416--20 (l992) (discllssing the use 
of the Alien Enemy Act during World War II). 
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.... "131 Because the Justice Department interpreted this to extend only 
to the removal of aliens who were U.S. residents, the State Department 
requested and obtained the Presidential Proclamation of September 
8, 1945, which specifically authorized the Secretary of State to remove 
to destinations outside the Western Hemisphere: 
All alien enemies now within the continental limits of the 
United States (1) who were sent here from other American 
republics for restraint and repatriation pursuant to interna-
tional commitments of the United States Government and for 
the security of the United States and its associated powers and 
(2) who are within the territory of the United States without 
admission under the immigration laws ... if their continued 
residence in the Western Hemisphere is deemed by the Sec-
retary of State prejudicial to the future security or welfare of 
the Americas as prescribed in Resolution VII of the Inter-
American Conference on Problems of War and Peace .... 132 
Implementing this proclamation created problems, as noted by 
JE. Doyle in a State Department memorandum of September 29, 1945. 
First, he said, the powers gran ted under the Alien Enemy Act were so 
sweeping that the Supreme Court might suspend its application upon 
the unconditional surrender of the enemy.133 In other words, because 
Japan had surrendered, the war was over and such measures were no 
longer needed. Second, some of the internees were not "alien ene-
mies," but were Peruvian citizens or U.S. citizens by virtue of their birth 
in the camps. Third, the continued residence of Japanese Peruvians in 
the Western Hemisphere could hardly be considered a threat to the 
security or welfare of the Americas. 134 Doyle concluded: 
[I] t remains far too clear that the initial apprehension of 
these persons, their removal to the United States, and their 
internment here has been accomplished in disregard of the 
very fundamentals of just and orderly procedure. From first 
to last ... these aliens have been denied a clear statement of 
131 Proclamation No. 2662, reprinted in 50 U.S.C., Supp. IV, app. note prec. § I and in 59 
Stat. 880; see also Memorandum from J.E. Doyle, Summary Statement on Removal of Enemy Aliens 
Brought Here from the Other Americas, to Acting Secretary (Sept. 29,1945) 2-3, (711.62115 
AR/9-2945, NA) (on file with author) [hereinafterJ.E. Doyle, Summary Statement). 
l:l2 Proclamation No. 2662, reprinted in 50 U.S.C., Supp. IV, app. note prec. § I and in 59 
Stat. 880. 
133 See J.E. Doyle, Summary Statement, supra note 131, at 3. 
134 See GARDINER, supra note 7, at 132. 
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the charges against them or an opportunity to deny or to 
disprove the charges ... . 
It is now suggested that ... all but about 50 will be deported 
to Germany, Italy or Japan. It is not too much to say that this 
crowning disregard of basic notions of fairness and decency 
would earn for this program an equal place with the Mitchell 
Palmer raids and the anti-alien crusade that followed the first 
World War.135 
301 
Nonetheless, the deportations proceeded. Between November 
1945 and February 1946, the United States sent between 1400 and 1700 
Japanese Peruvians to a war-devastated, U.S.-occupied Japan. 136 Many 
of the deportees had no ties to Japan, some had never even been there 
and a number of the men had wives and children still living in Peru. 137 
Deemed "voluntary" by the State Department, many internees only 
acquiesced when Peru prohibited their return and the U.S. govern-
ment insisted that they would not be allowed to stay in the country.138 
In March 1946 Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed 
Attorney General Tom Clark, formerly the Coordinator of Alien Enemy 
Control and later a Supreme Court Justice: 
[i] n no case is there clear evidence that the individual's con-
tinued residence in this hemisphere would be prejudicial to 
the security and welfare of the Americas. I am therefore 
requesting you to inform [the approximately 425 remaining 
Japanese Peruvians] that they are no longer subject to re-
straint as dangerous alien enemies. 13 '1 
135].E. Doyle, Summary Statement, supra note 131, at 5-6. 
136WEGLYN, supra note II, at 64 & n.28 (stating that during this period 1700 Japanese 
Peruvians (700 men and their dependents) ,,"ere sent to Japan, but noting that the State Depart-
ment reports 1440 people '\"oluntarily returned to Japan"). 
137Id. at 64. 
138 In Ex parte Kenzo Arakawa, a habeas corpus proceeding challenging the gOl"ernment's 
right to hold the plaintiff in custody at Seabrook Farms and to depon him to Japan, the district 
court held that the plaintiff was la"fully detained pursuant to the Alien Enem\' Act and that the 
government could deport him to Japan without his consent despite the fact that the Axis nations 
had unconditionally surrendered and the President had proclaimed that hostilities had ceased. 
79 F. Supp. 468, 470-71 (E.D. Pa. 1947), But see United States ex rel. Paetau \'. Watkins, 164 F.2d 
457 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that an alien brought to the United States against his "ill for 
internment as an alien enemy could not be deported as an "immigrant" until he had been given 
the opportunity to depart voluntarily); United States ex rei. Von He}1I1ann Y. Watkins, 159 F.2d 
650 (2d Cir. 1947) (holding that a German brought to the United States from Costa Rica and 
interned pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act could be ordered removed from the country, but could 
not be held in custody unless it was shOlm that he "refused or neglected" to depart \"oluntarily). 
139GARDINER, supra note 7, at 136. 
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Acheson added, "[Y]ou will presumably wish to take steps looking 
toward their departure from the United States within a reasonable 
time."HIJ In other words, rather than deport them as "enemy aliens," 
the State Department turned responsibility for the expulsions over 
to the Justice Department who, through the INS, would deport the 
Japanese Peruvians as "illegal aliens. "HI 
In the spring of 1946, the 365 Japanese Peruvians still fighting 
deportation came to the attention of Wayne Collins, a remarkable 
attorney who represented Fred Korematsu in his challenge to the 
Japanese American internment as well as hundreds of Japanese Ameri-
cans in deportation proceedings where the government claimed they 
had "renounced" their U.S. citizenship.1+2 Collins, with the support of 
the ACLU of Northern California, filed two test cases challenging the 
Japanese Peruvian deportations, thereby delaying the process. He also 
arranged for about 200 Japanese Peruvians to be "paroled" (i.e., re-
leased from detention) for the purpose of working at Seabrook Farms, 
a frozen food processing plant in New Jersey which had been using 
civilian internee as well as German prisoner of war labor.143 
The plight of the Japanese Peruvians dragged on; their lives put 
on hold while Wayne Collins furiously pursued legal, political and 
diplomatic solutions. In the spring of 1949, seven years after the first 
Japanese Peruvians were seized, the State Department finally decided 
that "the obvious solution [was] to regularize their status in the United 
States as permanent immigrants legally admitted."144 Over the next few 
years, individual families managed to have their orders of deportation 
suspended, a process that required petitioning the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals and getting a resolution passed by Congress. In 1954 the 
HOld. at 136 & n.7. 
141 Thus, the arrest warrant of Iwamori Sakasegawa stated that he was to be deported because 
he did not have a valid visa, did not have an unexpired passport and was ineligible for citizenship 
at the time he entered the United States. See id. at 144-45. 
At this time, the restrictions of the Naturalization Act of 1790 which originally limited 
citizenship to "free white persons" had been modified to allow the naturalization of persons of 
African descent and persons from certain Asian countries, but the racial restriction still applied 
to those of japanese descent. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, 
"Foreignness," and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REv. 261, 271-72 (1997) [here-
inafter Alien and Non-Alien Alike]. See generally HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 3; Charles J. McClain, 
Tortuous Path, Elusive Goal: The Asian Quest for American Citizenship, 2 ASIAN LJ. 33 (1995). 
142 See generally JOHN CRISTGAU, "ENEMIES"; WORLD WAR II ALIEN INTERNMENT (1985); PETER 
IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR; THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1983). 
143 See CRISTGAU, supra note 142, at 177-78; GARDINER, supra note 7, at 141-51; WEGLYN, 
supra note II, at 64-65. 
lHGARDINER, supra note 7, at 168 (citing l\Iemorandum of B.C. Davis, to State Department 
(Apr. 15, 1949), (FW 71 1.94 II 5 AR/4-1349, RG 59, NA) (on file with author)). 
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Refugee Relief Act of 1953 was amended to provide that "[a]ny alien 
who establishes that prior to July 1, 1953, he ... was brought to the 
United States from other American republics for internment, may, not 
later than June 30, 1955, apply to the Attorney General of the United 
States for an adjustment of his immigration status."145 Thus, some of 
the interned Japanese Latin Americans were able to remain in the 
United States after years of uncertainty, during which time they had 
effectively been rendered stateless. 
II. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 
The forcible detention of japanese from Peru, arising out of a 
wartime collaboration among the governments of Peru, the United 
States, and the American republics, was clearly a violation of 
human rights and was not justified by any plausible threat to the 
security of the Western Hemisphere. 
-John Emmerson, Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Lima, 
Peru, 1942-43 146 
The U.S. kidnapping, deportation, internment, holding hostage 
and forced repatriation of Japanese Perm1ans constituted a series of 
war crimes.147 These crimes did not result from the actions of a few 
individuals, but from a callous and widespread disregard for the rights 
of the people involved and the applicable international law. Those 
responsible for making and carrying out U.S. policy willingly violated 
the law for perceived strategic and/or political advantage. Much of 
what we now call human rights law, particularly that which protects 
individuals against the actions of their own governments, emerged out 
of World War II ,148 but during the war there was already in place a large 
body of well-established international humanitarian law that covered 
the treatment of civilians during war.14!l To establish the principles of 
international law that were in effect at the time of the Japanese Peru-
145Id. at 171. 
146EMMERSON, supm note 7, at 149. 
147 See generally Manjusha P. Kulkarni, Note, Application of the Civil Liberties Act to Japanese 
Peruvians: Seeking Redress for Deportation and Internment Conducted b)' the United States Govern-
ment During World War II, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 309 (1996); Kam Nakano, Japanese Latin 
Americans, The Forgotten Victims of World War 2: A Litigation Strategy Based on International 
Law (1997) (unpublished) (manuscript on file with author). 
148 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Internationalization of Human Rights, quoted in LoUIS HENKIN, 
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw CASES AND MATERIALS 596, 597 (3d ed. 1993) ("Real, full-blown 
internationalization of human rights came in the wake of Hitler and '''''odd War II."). 
149 See generally Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanil)', 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 171 
(1997) (describing the evolution of international humanitarian law); Karen Parker & Jennifer F. 
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vian internment, we look to both conventions and customary interna-
tional law. ISO By World War II, there was generally recognized interna-
tionallaw applicable to many areas implicated by the U.S. internment 
of Japanese Latin Americans: mutual self-defense treaties and the ex-
tent of permissible involvement of nonbelligerents in hostilities; the 
treatment of "enemy aliens" and prisoners of war; the treatment of 
civilians in occupied territories and in nonbelligerent countries; the 
transfer and deportation of civilian populations; the granting, with-
holding and revoking of citizenship; governmental responsibility for 
citizens, including a prohibition on rendering people stateless; and 
forced repatriation. 151 This Section examines the specific provisions of 
international law that were violated by the U.S. government's actions 
and its ongoing refusal to compensate the victims. 
A. Kidnapping and Deportation 
The United States violated well-established principles of interna-
tionallaw by collaborating with the Peruvian government -and other 
Latin American governments-to kidnap and deport civilian noncom-
batants from a nonbelligerent to a belligerent country on the basis of 
their racial or ethnic identification, without charge, hearing or deter-
mination that they posed a serious threat to U.S., Peruvian or "hemi-
spheric" security. Article 49 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 states: 
Chew, Compensation forJapan S World lVta II War Rnpe Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. 
REV. 497, 511-21 (1994) (describing customary and conventional law applying toJapan's use of 
"comfort women" during ''''orld War II). 
150 The Statute of International Coun of Justice, established in June 1945, states in Article 
38 that in making decisions "in accordance with international law," the IC] shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting States; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; [and] 
(d) [as a subsidiary and non-binding means of determination,] judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations. 
Statute of the IC], Art. 38, June 26,1945,59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. 
In l\Iay 1945, in drafting the Executive Agreement Relating to the Pmsecution of European 
Axis 'Val' Criminals, the Allied Powers agreed that "'International law' shall be taken to include 
treaties between nations and the principles of the law of nations as they result fmm the usages 
established amoug civilized peoples fmm laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public con-
science." Executive Agreement Relating to the Pmsecution of Eumpean Axis War Criminals 
(drafts 3 & 4), 'l! 12 in THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD 206 
(Bradley F. Smith ed., 1982). 
151 See general(v Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Deportation and Transfer of Civilians in Time of War, 
26 VAND.]. TRANsN.n'L L. 469 (1993). 
December 1998] 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 275 305 
"Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of pro-
tected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupy-
ing power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are pro-
hibited, regardless of their motive. "152 Article 146 provides that the 
parties will "undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be 
committed, any of the grave breaches ... defined in the following 
Article. "153 That Article defines grave breaches to include "unlawful 
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person 
.... "154 While the drafting of this treaty was not completed until a few 
years after World War II, "[t]hese articles of the Geneva Comention 
of 1949 merely codify the prohibition of deportations of civilians from 
occupied territories which in fact already existed in the laws and 
customs of war."155 A proposal to prohibit deportations had been in-
cluded in the Tokyo Draft of Geneva IV adopted at the International 
Red Cross Conference of 1934,156 and some of this customary law had 
been codified in the 1907 Hague Regulations. 157 According to the 
Commentary to the 1949 Geneva Convention, the 1907 Hague Regu-
lations probably did not explicitly prohibit deportations "because the 
152Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Ci\'ilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.s.T. 3576, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Gene\'a COI1\'ell-
tion], reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, 271, 288 (Adam Roberts & Richard GlIelff 
eds., 1982) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS]. The United States signed the treaty in 1949 and ratified 
it in 1955. ~11ile Article 49 deals specifically with the treatment of civilians in territory which has 
been occupied, one could not expect there to be less protection of ci\ilians in territory which 
has not been directly occupied, but has a government which collaborates with a belligerent state 
to the extent of deporting its ci\·ilians into the custody of that belligerent state. See id. See gPIIl'rall)' 
Civilian Protection in Modern Warfare: A Critical Analysis of the Geneva Civilian Conllention of 
1949,14 VA.]. INT'L L. 123 (1973). 
153 Geneva Convention, art. 146, sU/Jra note 152, reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 152, at 
323. 
154Id. Article 4 defines protected persons as "those who, at a given moment and in any 
manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party 
to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals." Id. art. 4, DOCUMENTS, supra 
note 152, at 273. 
ISS Alfred M. De Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16 HAR\,. I:-n'L LJ. 
207,210 (1975); see also Theodore !'vleron, The GenellO Conlle11tions as Custo1llarJ Lalli, 81 AM.]. 
INT'L L. 348 (1987) (discussing the significance of considering the Geneva Conventions as 
embodying customary international la,,·). 
156 See DOCUMENTS, supra note 152, at 271 (quoting the Prefatory Note to the 1949 Geneva 
Convention) . 
157 See Convention (IV) Respecting the La,,'s and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 
reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 152, at 43; Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties 
of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of '''-'ar on Land, Oct. 10, 1907 [hereinafter The Hague 
COI1\'ention], r'fjJrinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 152, at 61. 
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practice of deporting persons was regarded ... as having fallen into 
abeyance. "158 
In 1863, well before the Hague Conventions, the United States 
had condemned the deportation of civilians in Lieber's Code, "the first 
instance in western history in which the government of a sovereign 
nation established formal guidelines for its army's conduct toward its 
enemies."15~ Also known as U.S. Army General Order 100, the Code 
stated, "[p]rivate citizens are no longer murdered, enslaved, or carried 
off to distant parts, and the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed 
in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can 
afford . . . . "lI;U 
Deportations had also been condemned by international judicial 
practice. In 1924, in Moriaux v. Germany, the Belgo-German Mixed 
Arbitral Tribunal considered the legality of the deportation of Belgian 
civilians to Germany during World War I and concluded that deporta-
tions were a "most flagrant and atrocious breach of international 
law."lIil In the Chevreau case, discussed below in the context of intern-
ment,11i2 the arbitrator took into consideration the claimant's deporta-
tion from Persia to Mesopotamia, India and Egypt in awarding him 
damages against the British goyernment. 163 
Throughout the Second World War, the Allies made it clear that 
they considered the mass expulsion of civilians to be criminal. 164 The 
war crimes for which German and Japanese defendants were convicted 
by the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals included the deportation of 
158 Henckaerts, supra note 151, at 480 (quoting COMMENTARY TO THE IVTH GENEVA CON-
YENTION RELATIYE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 4-5, 279 (Jean 
Pictet ed., 1958)); see also Raymund T. Yingling & Robert W. Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 411-24 (1952) (describing the pmvisions relating to civilians). 
De Zayas states, "Analogously, it would have seemed unnecessary to the delegates convened at 
The Hague in 1907 to draft special articles to pmhibit cannibalism Or human sacrifices." De Zayas, 
supra note 155, at 211. 
159 RICHARD HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 1 (1983); see also Henckaerts, 
supra note 151, at 483. 
160 HARTIGAN, supra note 159, at 45, 49; see also Henckaerts, supra note 151, at 483. 
161 Moriaux v. Germany, 4 M.A.T. 674, 679 (1924), quoted in 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 228-29 (1968). 
162 See France ex rei Madame Julien Chevreau, M.S. Dep't of State (file no. 500, AIA/1197) 
(on file with author); see also infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
163 See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 161, at 229 (citations omitted). 
164De Zayas, supra note 155, at 213-14, (citing the IntelcAllied Meeting in St.James' Palace 
in London (Sept. 24, 1941) which endorsed the Plinciples of the Atlantic ChaTter, the Allied 
Declaration on German War Climes (adopted Jan. 13, 1942); a Decree on the Punishment of Gelman 
War Crimes Committed in Poland, adopted by the Polish Exile Cabinet (Oct. 17, 1942); and 
declarations at the J\Ioscow Conference (Oct. 19-30, 1943)). 
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civilians. 165 Schwarzenberger states, "In the Charter of Nuremberg Tri-
bunal, deportation of civilians from octupied territories to slave labour 
or for any other purpose is enumerated, under the heading of war 
crimes in the strict sense, that is, breaches of the laws or customs of 
war, and that of crimes against humanity."166 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals focused especially on the 
use of deported civilians as slave labor.167 "Forced labour in tropical 
heat without protection from the sun, complete lack of housing and 
medical supplies and insistence on work directly related to military 
operations were some of the features of forced labour castigated in the 
TokyoJudgment (1948)."168 This description fits quite closely the ac-
tions of the United States in forcing the two shiploads of Japanese Latin 
Americans to clear jungles and build barracks in the Canal Zone 
without remuneration. 169 
If the Germans and Japanese were responsible for knowing that 
the deportation of civilians was a war crime, surely the United States, 
which prosecuted them for these acts, was similarly charged with the 
165 Article 6 of the Charter of London, which established the basis for the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, gaye the Tribunal jurisdiction oyer three categories of crimes: 
(l) crimes against peace; (2) war crimes, "namely, \'iolations of the la\\'s or customs of war ... 
[which] shall include, but not be limited to ... ill-treatment or deportation to sla\'e labor or for 
an)' other purpose of civilian population .... "; and (3) crimes against humanity, which included 
"deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against an)' civilian population ... ; or perse-
cution on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic la\\" of the 
country where perpetrated." Agreement and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 
6,82 U.N.T.S. 279 (1945), l-epl'inted in THE AMERICAK ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 150, at 
212, 215. See generally William J. Fenrick, Attachillg the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 
DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 539, 541-49 (1997) (discussing, in the context of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, how the concepts of military objecti\'e and propor-
tionality limit what can be done to ch"ilians under the laws and customs of war). 
Id. 
166 See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 161, at 23. He continues: 
In the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal, the subject is specifically mentioned only 
under the latter heading .... [T] here is, ho\\"ever, no doubt about it that breaches 
of the law of belligerent occupation constitute breaches of the laws and customs of 
war, and therefore, amount to war crimes in the technical sense. Thus, under both 
Charters, deportation is a war crime in the technical sense and a crime against 
humanity. 
167 See id. at 225-26, 230-32. Compulsory labor was also forbidden by Article 52 of the Hague 
Regulations of 1899 and 1907. See id. at 224-25. 
168 See id. at 225-26. 
169 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. Article 2 of the International Labour Organi-
zation Convention, No. 29, Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour defines forced labor as 
"all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of a penalty and for 
which the person has not offered himself voluntarily," June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55,58; see also 
Parker & Chew, supra note 149, at 524. 
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knowledge that taking civilians from their homes in a nonbelligerent 
third country to concentration camps in a belligerent country, and 
forcibly deporting them to the occupied territory of another belliger-
ent country after the war, likewise violated the same well-established 
principles of international law.I7O 
B. Indefinite Internment of Civilians 
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 considered the 
internment of civilians by belligerents and decided that an express 
prohibition was not required as the practice fell below the minimum 
standard of civilization. lil 
In 1930 the Greco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal held in Nacio 
v. Germany that a neutral national unjustifiably detained by an occupy-
ing power is entitled to compensation. 172 The same Tribunal held m 
Palios v. Germany that 
any arrest or internment of a neutral national, not followed 
by criminal proceedings and condemnation, was contrary to 
international law. As neutral nationals are not entitled to any 
privileged treatment, in comparison with the rest of the popu-
lation of the occupied country, this finding applies also to the 
population at large of the occupied territory.173 
170 Henckaerts summarizes the state of the law regarding deportations at the time of the 
Japanese Peruvian internillent: 
\\11en all the pieces of this international humanitarian law puzzle are put together, 
the picture becomes apparent. Deportations were prohibited under the Hague 
Regulations as falling below the standards of civilization. As such they have become 
part of customary international law merely clarified in Geneva IV. Being part of 
customary international law and prohibited by the Hague Regulations, the Charter 
of the International Military Tribunal did not nm counter to the adage nullem 
[lilllen, nulla poena sine lege when it classified deportations as an international 
crime. 
Henckaerts, supra note 151, at 484. 
Deportation of civilians is, of course, still recognized as a war crime. At the urging of the 
United States, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 674 of October 29, 1990, applying 
Geneva IV to Iraq and condemning the Iraqi government for deponing Kuwaitis. U.N. SCOR, 
Res. 674 (1990). 
171 Schwarzenberger notes that, ironically, the Japanese delegate to the 1907 conference 
proposed declaring such internment illegal, but the Belgian delegate rejected it as redundant 
because it was generally accepted that belligerents could only intern prisoners of war. See SCHWAR-
ZENBERGER, supra note 161, at 227 n.45. 
172 See id. at 221. 
173 See id. 
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In the Chevreau case the Sole Arbitrator, considering the legality of 
Chevreau's arrest and prolonged detention in a camp for Turkish 
prisoners of war, articulated three rules: 
(l) The arbitrary arrest, de ten tion or deportation of a for-
eign national may give rise to an international claim. If, how-
ever, the measures are taken in good faith and upon reason-
able suspicion, in particular in a zone of military operations, 
they do not involve any international liability. 
(2) In the case of an arrest, suspicions have to be verified 
by a serious inquiry, offering the legal safeguards customary 
among civilized nations. Moreover, the arrested person must 
be given an opportunity to defend himself .... If there is no 
inquiry, this is unduly delayed or the detention unnecessarily 
prolonged, an international claim is justified. 
(3) A detainee is to be treated in a manner befitting his 
station, and according to the standards habitually practiced 
by civilized nations. I 74 
According to Schwarzenberger, it was "the German and Japanese 
practices ... of wholesale internment of civilians in concentration 
camps, irrespective of security requirements in individual cases or 
for entirely different purposes"I75 that led to the much more precise 
codification of minimum standards concerning internment found 
in the 1949 Geneva Convention. I76 Article 42 of the Convention 
states that the "internment or placing in assigned residence of 
protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detain-
ing Power makes it absolutely necessary,"Iii and Article 43 provides 
that any person so interned "shall be entitled to have such action 
reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or admin-
istrative board ... [which, if the internment is maintained] shall 
periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or 
her case, with a view to the favorable amendment of the initial 
decision .... "178 
U.S. legal scholars and courts also recognize that arbitrary or 
prolonged detention is a violation of international law. According to 
the notes to Section 702 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations 
1741d. at 222. 
175 ]d. at 223. 
176 See Geneva Convention, supm note 152, arts. 41-43, 68, 78, 79-135, reprinted ill Docu-
MENTS, supra note 152, at 286-87, 294, 298-319. 
177 Id. art. 41, reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supm note 152, at 286. 
1781d. art. 43, rep/1nted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 152, at 286-87. 
310 40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 275 [Symposium 
Law of the United States, "[a]rbitrary detention is cited as a violation 
of international law in all comprehensive international human rights 
instruments .... It is included also in United States legislation and 
national policy statements citing violations of fundamental human 
rights .... "179 The United States District Court for the District of 
Kansas said in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson: 
Our review of the sources from which customary interna-
tionallaw is derived clearly demonstrates that arbitrary deten-
tion is prohibited by customary international law. Therefore, 
even though the indeterminate detention of an excluded 
alien cannot be said to violate the United States Constitution 
or our statutory laws, it is judicially remediable as a violation 
of internationallaw.18u 
The Alien Enemies Act authorized the presidential proclamations 
allowing the Attorney General to subject enemy aliens to "summary 
apprehension" during World War II.ISI This Act did not necessarily vio-
late international law for it is recognized that enemy aliens in the ter-
ritory of a belligerent can be detained, at least for as long as is neces-
sary to determine if they pose a danger to the security of the country. 1M2 
The Act and the related presidential proclamations, however, cannot 
justifY the indefinite detention of civilians who were brought into the 
territory against their will, were given no hearings and were known to 
pose no danger to U.S. or hemispheric security.IS3 
C. The Holding of Hostages 
A hostage is "a person detained for reasons unconnected with his 
own acts or omissions."184 As early as 1863, Lieber's Code stated that 
179REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702, 
n.6 (1987). 
1811505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Ran. 1980), afl'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). 
lHI Proclamation No. 2525, 6 Fed. Reg. 6321 (1941); Proclamation No. 2526, 6 Fed. Reg. 6323 
(1941); Proclamation No. 2527,6 Fed. Reg. 6324 (1941); replinted in 36 AM.]. INT'L L. 236-243 
(1942); see Sidak, supra note 130, at 1405-24 (summarizing the Alien Enemy Act and its applica-
tion). 
lH2See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. 
183 During World War II, Attorney General Biddle stated that although the Act did not entitle 
enemy aliens to hearings, he believed "each enemy alien who had been taken into custody should 
have an opportunity for a hearing on the question whether he should be interned" and more 
than 100 hearing boards were set up for this purpose. See Sidak, supra note 130, at 1416 (quoting 
1942 ATT'y GEN. ANN. REp. 9) (hearings not granted to the interned]apanese Latin Americans); 
see also I\Iichael Brandon, Note, Legal Control Over Resident Enemy Aliens in Time of War in the 
United States and in the United Kingdom, 44 lUI.]. INT'L L. 382 (1950). 
184SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 161, at 240-41. He bases this on the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal's reference to both prophylactic hostages and reprisal prisoners as hostages, noting that they 
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"[h]ostages are rare in the present age."IR5 Although hostages are not 
specifically referred to in the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907,IR6 
Article 50, by prohibiting the infliction of penalty upon the population 
of occupied territories for acts for which they cannot be held respon-
sible, effectively bans the taking of hostages.IR7 The prosecution of the 
Nuremburg Tribunals, led by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Jackson, 
argued that "irrespective of the illegality of the shooting of hostages, 
under Article 50 of the Hague Regulations, the taking of hostages was 
illegal. "188 
The 1934 Tokyo Draft of the International Red Cross Convention 
on the Protection of Civilian Alien Enemies forbade reprisals against 
civilians and the taking of hostages. lw1 The Nuremberg Tribunal re-
ferred on several occasions to the taking and killing of hostages, con-
demning, for example, under the heading of Murder and Ill-Treatment 
of Civilian Population, the German practice of "keeping hostages to 
prevent and to punish any form of civil disorder."19o 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention says that in the case of 
armed conflict within the territory of a Party, the taking of hostages is 
prohibited at any time and in any place with respect to persons taking 
no active part in the hostilities. I'll With respect to persons in occupied 
territories, Article 34 of the 1949 Geneva Convention simply states, 
"[t]he taking of hostages is prohibited."192 \tVhile the Gene\'a Conven-
tion had not been drafted at the time the United States was holding 
Japanese Latin Americans as hostages for exchange, it illustrates what 
was commonly accepted in international law at the time. Under this 
law, the Japanese Peruvians were hostages, held not because of any acts 
or omissions of their own, but because the U.S. government thought 
"have in common that they are arrested on grounds not invoking any personal responsibility of 
their own." Id. This definition clearly fits the interned Japanese Latin Americans. 
185 HARTIGAN, supra note 159, at 56. 
186 Apparently this was because of the bitterness still existing among some parties regarding 
the taking of hostages in the Franco-German War of 1870-71. See SCH\\"ARZEKBERGER, supra note 
161, at 234. 
187 See id. at 237-39. 
188ld. at 240 (citing IMT Proceedings (English ed.), Pt. 5, at 124 (1946)). 
189 See Robert R. Wilson, Treatment oj Civilian Alien Enemies, 137 A.\1. J. IKT'L L. 30, 34-35 
(1943). 
1905CH\\,ARZENBERGER, supra note 161, at 239-40. Although the Charter of the Tribunal 
listed the killing of hostages as an example of "'ar crimes, the Tribunal did not rule specifically 
on the taking of hostages. 
HI! See Geneva Convention, supra note 152, art. 3(1) (b), replinted in DOCUMEKTS, supra note 
152, at 273. Article 3 of the 1949 Gene\"a COIl\'ention states that in the case of armed conflict 
within the territory of a party, the taking of hostages is prohibited at any time and in any place 
with respect to persons taking no active part in the hostilities. See id. 
192 See id. art. 34, reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 152, at 284. 
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it could use them, either as "bait" for an exchange or as a "reprisal 
reserve" to gain better treatment for U.S. citizens held by the Japanese 
government. 
D. Refusal to Compensate 
"The right to redress an international wrong is recognized by 
scholars as a fundamental principle of customary law. Recognition of 
this right clearly pre-dates World War II, and it has been incorporated 
into both treaties and international legal opinions."193 In 1928, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the Chorzow Factory 
case that "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all consequences 
of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would ... have 
existed if the act had not been committed."194 According to the settled 
practice of arbitration tribunals, a belligerent country is not responsi-
ble for accidental injury to a neutral national or damage to neutral 
property in a theater of war. If, however, the action taken by the bel-
ligerent state is contrary to the laws of war, the belligerent country is 
liable under international law for paying compensation.195 The Hague 
Convention of 1907 defines "neutrals" as nationals of a state not taking 
part in war.196 Accordingly, all of the Japanese Peruvians holding Peru-
vian citizenship were neutral nationals. Those holding Japanese citi-
zenship, however, should have been entitled to the same general pro-
tections because "[t]he basic rule is that, compared with other 
inhabitants of occupied territories, neutral nationals resident there are 
not entitled to any privileged treatment. "197 If those holding Peruvian 
citizenship are entitled to compensation, the others should be as well. 
In Nacio v. Germany, the Greco-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal 
considered the case of a Greek national who was arrested and held by 
193 See Parker & Chew, supm note 149, at 524; see also Jimenez de A/-echaga, International 
Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 REc. DES COURS 285-87 (1978), reprinted in HENKIN ET 
AL., supra note 148, at 583 ("A State discharges the responsibility incumbent upon it for breach 
of an international obligation by making reparation for the injury caused."). This principle was 
also recognized by the district court in Rodriguez-Fernandez. v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 
(D. Kan. 1980), afi'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (lOth Cir. 1981). 
The explanation that the violations of international law described above were a product of 
"wartime hysteria" is belied not only by the treatment of Japanese Penlvians immediately after 
the war, but also by the U.S. government's consistent refusal to compensate the victims in the 
inten'ening 50 years. 
HHChorzow Factory (Indemnity), 1928 P.C.lJ. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47; see Parker & Chew, supra 
note 149, at 524, n.159. 
195 See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 161, at 583. 
196Hague Convention, supm note 157, art. 16, reprinted in DOCUMENTS, supra note 152. 
197 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 161, at 584. 
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German occupation forces in Rumania. Suspected of concealing weap-
ons, he was released after eight days. The Tribunal held that the 
occupation authorities could arrest persons in the territory, including 
neutral nationals, suspected of acts which constituted a security threat. 
It added, however, that "if, in fact, the detention was uruustified, a 
detainee was entitled to compensation for any actual damage suffered, 
and that the non-payment of such compensation constituted an illegal 
act under Section 4 of the Annex to Articles 297 and 298 of the Peace 
Treaty of Versailles of 1919."198 In Palios v. Germany, the same Tribunal 
considered a claim by a Greek restaurant owner who was detained for 
three months in Bucharest. It held that any arrest and detention of a 
neutral national, if not followed by a judgmen t involving conviction or 
the payment of compensation, constitutes an "act contrary to interna-
tional law. "199 
Applying these principles, the U.S. failure to compensate the 
Japanese Latin American victims of these war crimes is itself a violation 
of international law. That these crimes were committed over fifty years 
ago does not reduce the government's responsibility. Although the 
United States is not a party to the Convention on the Non-Applicability 
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, 
which entered into force in 1970, the Convention reflects customary 
international law on this principle. The Convention notes, for exam-
ple, that none of the declarations, instruments or conventions that 
relate to the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
as defined by the London Charter, have prodded for a period of 
limitation.2uo Furthermore, because it has an ongoing responsibility to 
compensate the victims, the United States is engaging in an ongoing 
violation by failing to do so and in that respect, even if a statute of 
limitations did apply, it would not have begun to toll. 
The United States' ongoing refusal to adequately compensate the 
Japanese Latin Americans also raises questions of racial and national 
origin discrimination. U.S. officials were clearly cognizant ofthe racism 
behind the Peruvian government's efforts to rid the country of its 
Japanese population. They supported this attitude and collaborated 
with the Peruvian authorities in this matter, taking only those German 
and Italian Peruvians who were individually deemed to be dangerous, 
19R Id. at 221, 584. 
199Id. 
200 Convention on the Non-Applicability of StatlttOl)' Limitations to Hal" Climes and Climes 
Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40, U.N. Doc. A/n18 
(1968). 
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while kidnapping and deporting Japanese Peruvians solely on the basis 
of their Japanese ancestry.~Ul 
At the time of the internment, there were no international agree-
ments prohibiting racial discrimination. Due in large measure to the 
horrors of World War II, however, such prohibitions have become 
well-established in international law. The Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, adopted in 1948, states: "everyone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
orother opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. "202 This is also the language prohibiting discrimination in Article 
2 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2U3 
to which the United States is a party, and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which the United States has 
signed but not ratified.21J4 The International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination defines "racial discrimi-
nation" to mean: 
Any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on 
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has 
the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recogni-
tion, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural or any other field of public life.205 
The American Convention on Human Rights obligates the parties 
~Ol See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
~II~ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 2 (1948). 
~1I3International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. II, 1: 1, 999 
U.N.T.S. at 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, ratified by the United States onJune 8, 1992). 
~(H International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N .T.S. 
3, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976), art. 2(2). This CO\"enant has been signed but not ratified by the United 
States. According to Article 18 of the Vienna Comention on Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/27, 
May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 17, 1990, a party that has signed but not ratified a treaty, 
unless it has made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty, may not act in a manner 
which defeats the object or purpose of the treaty. The Vienna Comention has not been ratified 
by the United States, but it is widely recognized that the rule stated in Article 18 "is one of the 
customary international law," and thus binds the United States. BURNS H. WESTON, RICHARD A. 
FALK & HILARY CHARLESWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 90 (3d ed. 1997) 
(quotingJ.G. STARKE, STARKE'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 404-18 (lIth ed. 1994». 
205 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 600 
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4,1969), G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., annex 2, 
art. I, , I. 
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to undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized 
herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdic-
tion the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, 
without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social con-
dition.206 
315 
These standards are now almost universally acknowledged. The 
racial discrimination manifest in the wholesale internment of Japanese 
Americans and Japanese Latin Americans should encourage the 
United States to comply with its international obligation to compensate 
the Japanese Latin American internees for the losses inflicted upon 
them. 207 
III. EXAMINING CURRENT DOMESTIC REMEDIES 
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not ajJt to last longer 
than the military emergency . ... But once a judicial ojJinion 
rationalizes such an order to show that it conJorms to the Consti-
tution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the 
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court Jor all time has 
validated the principle oj racial discrimination in criminal proce-
dure and oj transplanting American citizens. The principle then 
lies about like a loaded weapon ready Jor the hand oj any authority 
that can bring Jorward a plausible claim oj urgent need. 
-justice jackson, dissenting in Korematsu v. United States, 
December 1944 208 
A basic principle of our legal system is that there should be a 
remedy for every wrong. As the U.S. Supreme Court said in Marbury 
v. Madison, "the very essence of ch'i! liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever 
he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford 
206The American Con\'ention on Human Rights, No\,. 22,1969,9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into 
force July 18,1978). The United States has not signed this Comention. By \'irtue of its member-
ship in the Organization of American States, hO\\-e,-er, it is bound by the American Declaration 
on the Rights and Duties of Man. 
207Referring to the Japanese American internment, Justice Murphy said in his dissent in 
Korematsll v. United States, "[n)o adequate reason is gi\'en for the failure to treat these Japanese 
Americans on an indi\'idual basis by holding in\'estigations and hearings to separate the loyal 
from the disloyal, as was done in the case of persons of German and Italian ancestry." 323 U.S. 
214, 241 (1944) (Murphy, j., dissenting). 
20H ld. at 246 (Jackson, j., dissenting). 
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that protection. "~09 This Section looks at the remedies available to the 
Japanese Peruvians under U.S. law and concludes that they are inade-
quate-perhaps nonexistent-because of the failure of U.S. courts to 
enforce international law. 
The Japanese Latin Americans interned by the United States were 
innocent victims of U.S. policy gone astray. John Emmerson, who 
coordinated the removals for the U.S. embassy in Lima, says: 
As I look back on the Peruvian experience I am not proud to 
have been part of the Japanese operation. One steeled one-
self against the heartbreak being inflicted on hundreds of 
innocent Japanese .... It is hard to justify our pulling them 
from their homes of years and herding them,' whether born 
in Japan or in Peru, onto ships bound for a strange land, 
where they would live in concentration camps under condi-
tions which at best were difficult .... 210 
The United States has never explained these actions, although the 
President's letter to the internees states that they were treated "un-
justly" by government actions "rooted in racial prejudice and war-
time hysteria. "2Jl The claim of hysteria is itself dubious since, even 
at the time of their abduction, justice and State Department officials 
recognized that these individuals were not dangerous to U.S. or 
hemispheric security.212 
Japanese Latin American internees were subjected to conditions 
similar to those inflicted upon the Japanese American internees and, 
in addition, suffered the trauma of being uprooted from their coun-
tries and effectively rendered stateless. Why, then, would the U.S. 
government offer them only a fraction of the compensation given 
Japanese Americans? The answer lies in (1) the precedent established 
~lJYl\larbury \'. Madison. 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). Citing Blackstone, the Court continues, "it 
is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy 
by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is ilwaded." /d. (citations omitted). 
210 E"IMERSON, supra note 7, at 148. 
211 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
212 The excuse of "wartime hysteria" only illustrates why it is precisely during times of war or 
other national crisis that our civil liberties must be most vigilantly protected. Nonetheless, the 
history of Asian Americans illustrates that the internment of Japanese Americans during World 
'''ar II was not an aberration attributable to wartime, but the logical extension of a long history 
of legalized racism. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Alodel Mirwrity, Yellow Peril: Functions of ''Foreignness'' 
in the Construction of Asian Amelican Legal Identity, 4 ASIAN LJ. 71, 77-89 (1997). Furthel; even 
if one were to accept "wartime hysteria" as part of the motivation for the intei'nment of Japanese 
Americans, it is difficult to conceive of any way in which the Japanese Latin Americans who were 
abducted from their countries and brought to the United States could have been seen as any 
kind of threat to the United States (at least until they were brought here!). 
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by the Supreme Court in the Japanese American internment cases, 
(2) the narrowly tailored terms of the law prO\'iding redress to Japa-
nese Americans and (3) the U.S. legal system's disregard for interna-
tionallaw. 
A. The Internment of Japanese Americans and the Supreme Court 
In the spring of 1942, all Japanese Americans lh'ing on the West 
Coast of the United States were rounded up and taken to concentra-
tion camps in desolate parts of the country. Nearly 120,000 people were 
imprisoned for several years without charge, hearing or conYiction-
two-thirds of them American citizens by birth; more than half either 
over fifty or under fifteen years of age.213 Despite the fact that nearly 
one-third of Hawaii's population was Japanese American and Hawaii 
was under martial law, no mass incarcerations materialized there. In-
stead, individual hearings resulted in about 2000 of the 160,000 Japa-
nese Hawaiians being sent to mainland internment camps.214 On the 
mainland, some German and Italian aliens-not U.S. citizens-were 
subjected to restrictions, but only those deemed dangerous after indi-
vidual hearings were interned.215 
The legal basis for the Japanese American internment was Execu-
tive Order No. 9066 ("EO 9066"), issued by President Roosevelt on 
February 19, 1942. EO 9066 authorized the Secretary of War, and 
commanders he designated, to prescribe "military areas" from which 
they could exclude "any or all persons."21G It made no explicit reference 
to Japanese Americans. In order to enforce military exclusion orders 
against civilians, the War Department quickly persuaded Congress to 
213 See generally COMMISSION ON \\'ARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERN~IENT OF CIYILIANS, 
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982); IRONS, supra note 142; JAPANESE AMERICANS: FROM RELOCA-
TION TO REDRESS (Roger Daniels et aI., eds., 1991); \\'EGLYK, supra note 11; Rosto\\" supra note 
118; Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, Foe, or Something Else: Social Aleanillgs of RRdress and Reparations, 
20 DENV.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 223 (1992); Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Correcting the 
Injustice of Extraordinar)' Government Excess and Lax Judicial Review: Time for a Better AccolI/ mo-
dation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. RE\,. 1 (1986). 
214 Rostow, supra note 118, at 494. 
21!iYale Law School Professor Eugene Rostow saw clearly in 1945 that 
[t]he dominant factor in the de\'e!opment of this policy was not a military estimate 
of a military problem, but familiar West Coast attitudes of race prejudice. The 
program of excluding all persons of japanese ancestry from the coastal area was 
conceived and put through by the organized minority \dlOSe business it has been 
for forty-five years to increase and exploit racial tensions of the West Coast. 
Id. at 496; see also id. at 492-93. See generallJ CRISTGAV, supra note 142 (detailing the stories of 
individual German and japanese internees). 
216 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942), leprinted i1l18 U.S.C. § 97a (Supp. 1943), 
and in 56 Stat. 173 (1942); see also IRONS, supra note 142, at 61-63. 
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enact Public Law 503, which made it a misdemeanor to "enter, remain 
in, leave, or commit any act in any military area ... contrary to the 
restrictions applicable to such area .... "217 Three days after Roosevelt 
signed this into law, Lt. Gen. DeWitt issued curfew orders directed to 
all alien enemies and all U.S. citizens of Japanese descent on the West 
Coast. DeWitt also issued the first of 108 exclusion orders which forced 
"all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien" to evacuate 
their homes on a few days notice and report to "assembly centers" with 
only such personal belongings as they could carry.218 
As Nanette Dembitz pointed out in 1945, the internment ofJapa-
nese Americans was "the first instance in which the applicability of a 
deprivation or restraint imposed by the Federal Government [upon a 
citizen] depended solely upon the citizen's race or ancestry."219 Four 
U.S. citizens-Min Yasui, Gordon Hirabayashi, Fred Korematsu and 
Mitsuye Endo-brought legal challenges to the internment. 
The first case the Supreme Court ruled on was Hirabayashi v. 
United States. 220When the United States entered World War II, Gordon 
Hirabayashi was a senior at the University of Washington, a YMCA 
officer, a Quaker and a pacifist. Instead of obeying the evacuation 
order, in May 1942 he turned himself in to the FBI and was convicted 
of failing to report for evacuation and violating curfew.221 The Supreme 
Court addressed only the curfew, not the evacuation, unanimously 
holding that it was a reasonable exercise of Congress's and the Execu-
tive's power to wage war, and that its imposition against only those 
217Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. at 1407, reprinted in 18 U.S.c. § 97a, and in 56 Stat. 
173; see also IRONS, supra note 142, at 66-68; Rosto\\" wpra note 118, at 498. Ohio Republican 
Senator Robert Taft raised the only objection to the bill, saying "I think this is probably the 
'sloppiest' criminal law I have e\'er read or seen anywhere." IRONS, supra note 142, at 68. 
218 See IRONS, supra note 142, at 68-70. Public Proclamations No.1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320 (1942), 
No.2, 7 Fed. Reg. 2405 (1942), No.3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (1942) and other proclamations restricted 
travel, residence and activities of enemy aliens and Japanese American citizens. Civilian Exclusion 
Order No.1, :\Iarch 24, 1942,7 Fed. Reg. 2581 (1942) was the first evacuation order. See Rostow, 
supra note 118, at 498 n.30. Executive Order No. 9102 established the War Relocation Authority 
to O\'ersee the internment program. See Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2165 (1942); see also 
IRONS, supra note 142, at 69-70. 
219Nanette Dembitz, Ifflcial DisClimination and the j\:1ilitary Judgment: The Supreme Court's 
Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 175, 176 (1945). Slavery was, of course, 
imposed on African Americans by virtue of their race and protected by the Constitution and 
federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, art. II, § 9, art. IV, § 2; Paul Finkelman, A Covenant with 
Death: SlavelY and the Constitution, AM. VISIONS, May-June 1968, at 21. However, as the Supreme 
Court made painfully clear in Dred Scott lI. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 454 (1857), African Americans 
were not citizens under the law until the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted. See U.S. CON ST. 
amend. XIV. 
22°320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
221 See id. 
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persons of Japanese ancestry did not violate the Fifth Amendment's 
guarantee of due process. 222 Similarly, the Court sustained the curfew 
and avoided ruling on the internment in Yasui v. United States. 223 
Korematsu and Endowere not decided until December 1944, after 
President Roosevelt had been successfully re-elected. Fred Korematsu 
was a shipyard welder, born and raised in Oakland, turned down when 
he volunteered for the Na\y and fired when his union expelled all 
persons of Japanese ancestry. He refused to report for evacuation and 
was arrested by the local police. The Supreme Court upheld his con-
viction for violating the evacuation order by a vote of six to three, but 
avoided addressing the detention. The Court addressed the charge of 
racial discrimination with the following mind-boggling logic: 
It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprison-
ment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of 
his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loy-
alty .... To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice ... 
merely confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from 
the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He 
was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire 
224 
According to Yale Law School Professor Eugene Rostow, one of the 
earliest critics of these decisions, Justice Black's majority found that 
"the exclusion orders merely applie[d] the two findings [of Hira-
bayashi]-that the Japanese are a dangerous lot, and that there was 
no time to screen them individually .... There [was] no attempt 
222 Id. Regarding the unanimity of the opinion, Irons reports that Justice l'vlurpln"s concur-
rence was originally written as a dissent, but Justice Frankfurter cOl1\'inced him that any dissent 
was "playing into the hands of the enemy." JUSTICE DELAYED 49 (Peter Irons, ed.) (1989) 
[hereinafter JUSTICE DELAYED]. 
223 320 U.s. 115 (1943). A graduate of the Uni\'ersity of Oregon Law School and an Army 
Resel'\'e officer, Min Yasui immediately reported for military sen,ice when ,,'ar broke out, but "'as 
rejected because of his Japanese ancestry. In l\Iarch 1942 he became the first to test the military 
orders by turning himself in to the Portland police. See IRONS, supra note 142, at 81-86. The 
district court held that the orders were unconstitutional as applied to American citizens, but that 
Yasui had renounced his American citizenship by working for the Japanese consulate. The 
Supreme Court reversed on both issues. It sustained the curfe\\' com-iction by referring to 
Himba)'shi and held that there was no evidence that Yasui had renounced his citizenship. See 
Yasui, 320 U.S. at 117. 
224 Kore11latsll, 323 U.S. at 223. Ex parte Endo was a habeas corpus proceeding brought after 
Mitsuye Endo had been determined to be "loyal" by the \\'ar Relocation Authority, but was still 
being held pending arrangements to place her in an area of the country "'here her presence 
would not cause "disorder." See 323 U.S. 283 (1944). The Court held her continued detention 
invalid "although temporary detention for the purpose of im'estigating loyalty ,,'as assumed to be 
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in the Korematsu case to show a reasonable connection between the 
factual situation and the program adopted to deal with it."225 
Rostow concluded, "[T]he Court, after timid and evasive delays, 
has now upheld the main features of the program. That step converts 
a piece of war-time folly into political doctrine, and a permanent part 
of the law. "226 F arty years later, Min Yasui, Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred 
Korematsu petitioned for writs of coram nobis, asking that their convic-
tions be overturned on the basis of newly discovered evidence-evi-
dence that government officials had deliberately altered, destroyed 
and suppressed evidence concerning the loyalty of Japanese Ameri-
cans; specifically, knowledge that the allegations of disloyalty and es-
pionage in General DeWitt's Final Report were false. Min Yasui died 
while the appeals were pending, but Korematsu's and Hirabayashi's 
convictions were vacated.227 Unfortunately, however, this does not over-
turn the precedent of the Supreme Court's 1943 and 1944 decisions. 
B. Redress for Japanese Americans: The Civil Liberties Act of 1988 
Japanese Americans' first step toward redress was the Evacuation 
Claims Act passed in July 1948.228 In Michi Weglyn's words, "though 
eminently successful in reaping media praise ... the post-war restitu-
tion program turned out to be uncharitable in the extreme."229 Only 
"tangible" losses that could be proven were compensated, i.e., damage 
to real or personal property. No interest was paid and claims litigation 
stretched out over seventeen years. 23U In 1951 Congress authorized 
valid as an incident to the program of 'orderly' evacuation approved in the Km-ematsu case." 
Rostow, wpra note 118, at 512. 
225 Rostow, slipra note 118, at 508-09. 
226 Id. at 491. He cut through to the heart of the matter: 
The Japanese exclusion program thus rests on five propositions of the utmost 
potential menace: (1) protective custody, extending over three or four years, is a 
permitted form of imprisonment in the United States; (2) political opinions, not 
criminal acts, may contain enough clear and present danger to justify such impris-
onment; (3) men, women and children of a given ethnic group, both Americans 
and resident aliens, can be presumed to possess the kind of dangerous ideas which 
require their imprisonment; (4) in time of war or emergency the military, perhaps 
withom even the concurrence of the legislature, can decide what political opinions 
require imprisonment, and which ethnic groups are infected with them; and (5) the 
decision of the military can be carried out without indictment, trial, examination, 
jury, the confrontatioil of witnesses, counsel for the defense, the privilege against 
self-incrimination, or any of the other safeguards of the Bill of Rights. 
Id. at 532. 
227 See KOlf!matsll v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Hirabayashi 11. United 
States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); IRONS, Sllpra note 142, at 125, 128-30. 
228 See WEGLYN, supra note 11, at 274. 
229 Id. 
231) See id. According to Edison Uno, "[tlhere was a total disregard of prevailing market value 
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"compromise" settlements of $2500 per family to speed up the process, 
and "at a time when families were reeling from destitution, going 
without medical attention, and the Issei [first generation] fast dying 
off," most chose to settle, regardless of the amount of their original 
claim. 231 Of the $400 million in material loss estimated by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, less than ten cents on the 1942 dollar 
was paid under the Claims Act.232 
By the 1970s a movement for redress had begun to take root in 
the Japanese American community, and in 1980 activist groups formed 
the National Coalition for Redress/Reparation which organized sup-
port for redress through letter-writing campaigns and public education 
events. At the urging of Senator Daniel Inouye, Congress established 
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. 
Mter hearings across the nation, the Commission issued its report, 
Personal justice Denied, acknowledging the "grave injustices" suffered by 
the interned Japanese Americans. 2'13 In August 1988 Congress enacted 
the Civil Liberties Act, which provided $20,000 for each surviving 
internee, an apology signed by President Reagan and a public educa-
tion fund. 234 The CLA, while providing symbolic redress, did not ac-
knowledge that the Japanese American internment was either illegal 
or unconstitutiona1. 235 
With the Supreme Court decisions upholding internment and the 
courts' rejection of claims for reparations, Japanese Americans ob-
tained redress through political action. The Japanese Latin Americans, 
or the irreplaceable nature of items lost .... Petitioners were totally at [the government arbiters'] 
mercysince the Justice Department attitude was 'take it or leave it.'" Id. at 2i5. 
231 Id, at 2i5. 
232Id, at 2i6. 
233 In March 1983, after the Commission's preliminary report had been released and the 
coram nobis petitions had been filed, William Hohri and the National Council for Japanese 
American Redress filed a class action redress suit on behalf of all surviving Japanese American 
internees, The il'\iuries for which they requested $24 million included "summary removal from 
their homes, imprisonment in racially segregated prison camps, and mass deprivations of their 
constitutional rights." JUSTICE DELAYED, supra note 222, at 2i, 46. The case was eventually 
dismissed. See Hohri v. United States, 482 U.S. 64 (l98i). 
234The work of the Original Legal Scholarship Collaborative, of which this Article is a part, 
was supported by this fund, the Civil Liberties Public Education Fund. 
It should be noted that the CLA did not provide payments for Hawaiian residents who were 
forcibly excluded from their homes, Nisei soldiers who were not allowed to \'isit their families in 
the camps or, of course the Japanese Latin Americans. See WEGLYN, supra note II, at 282. In 
Ishida 11. United States, 59 F.3d 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1995) and Consolo 11. United States, 65 F.3d 186 
(Fed. Cir. 1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit made children of 
"voluntary evacuees," those who had moved inland before the forced internment, eligible. 
235 Although it stated that one of its purposes was to "discourage the occurrence of similar 
injustices and violations of civ'illiberties in the future," it did little to ensure that. Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988,50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988). 
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however, being few in number and scattered across the globe, had little 
political clout. Seiichi Higashide, aJapanese Latin American internee, 
testified before the congressional Commission on Wartime Relocation 
and Internment of Civilians and encouraged other Japanese Latin 
American internees to testify.~3G Although the Japanese Latin American 
internment was reported in Appendix D of the Commission's report,237 
redress under the Civil Liberties Act was nonetheless limited to intern-
ees of Japanese descent who were citizens or permanent residents at 
the time of the internment.238 This set the stage for the Mochizuki 
litigation. 
C. Mochizuki v. United States: The Limits of Domestic Options 
It seems that the U.S. government would be estopped from deny-
ing Japanese Latin American internees constructive resident status for 
purposes of the Civil Liberties Act. 239 The Office of Redress Admini-
stration, however, declared most of the Japanese Latin Americans who 
applied under the CLA ineligible because they were not legal residents 
at the time of the internment. 24o In 1996, five of these rejected appli-
cants brought the Mochizuki case as a class action requesting that all 
interned Japanese Latin Americans be covered by the Act.241 This 
eminently reasonable and minimal demand proved difficult to enforce 
under domestic law. 
As discussed above, the precedents established by Hirabayashi, 
Yasui and Korematsu still stand, and there have been no federal cases 
holding such detention illegal. 242 At the time the CLA was passed, one 
~:luPress Release of Japanese Peruvian Oral History Project,June 1, 1998; see also Higashide, 
supra note 7. 
~:li CO~DIISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, supm note 213, 
App. D. 
2:3850 U.S.C. § 1989(b-7)(2)(A) defines an "eligible individual" as one who was "a United 
States citizen or a permanent resident alien" during the period of internment. 
239 See Kulkarni, supra note 147, at 335-37. 
2411 See Redress Provisions for Person of Japanese Ancestry, 28 C.F.R. § 74, 54 Fed. Reg. 34157, 
34160 (1989) ("persons of Japanese ancestry who were sent to the United States from other 
American countries for restraint and repatriation pursuant to international commitments of the 
United States Government for the security of the United States and its associated powers ... were 
determined by the Department of Justice to be illegal aliens"). Some internees who remained in 
the United States were able to obtain retroactive permanent resident status and they were deemed 
eligible for redress. See id. 
241 :\[ochizuki v. United States, No. 96-5986 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1996). 
242 In fact, in Jean 11. Nelson, 727 F.2d 937, 974-75 (1984), a case challenging the detention 
of Haitian asylum seekers, the Ele'enth Circuit interpreted Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) to mean that "e\'en an indefinitely incarcerated alien 'could not 
challenge his continued detention without a hearing.'" Garcia-Mirv. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 
(11th Cir. 1984). 
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redress case, Hohri v. United States, was pending.243 While Congress may 
have been influenced by the possibility ofajudgment requiring billions 
of dollars in reparations, no law required Congress to enact the CLA 
or to include the Japanese Latin Americans in its terms.244 Thus, the 
Mochizuki plaintiffs were limited to two rather narrow arguments for 
relief under the CLA: first, that they should be deemed constructive 
residents because they were forcibly brought here by the U.S. govern-
ment; and second, that providing reparations to Japanese Americans 
but not Japanese Latin Americans \'iolates the guarantee of equal 
protection under the Fifth Amendment. 245 
The constructive resident argument is a strong one from the 
perspective of morality and equity. Allowing the same government 
which forcibly removed and imprisoned these people to avoid respon-
sibility on the ground that they were here "illegally" is grotesquely 
absurd.246 There is precedent for deeming people "permanent resi-
dents under color of law" ("PRUCOL") even when they do not have 
resident status under the Immigration and Nationality Act.24i Given 
243 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
244That the reparations paid to Japanese Americans were not required by law, but provided 
at Congress's discretion is illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's holding in Cato", United States, a case 
seeking more than $100 million in reparations for African Americans for damages that n'sulted 
from slavery and subsequent racial discrimination. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the repa-
rations paid Japanese Americans did not prmlde any precedent for the African American plain-
tiffs because" [t] hose reparations were not awarded as damages in court but rather "'ere enacted 
into law in the Ch'il Liberties Act of 1988 .... The legislature, rather than the judiciar\', is the 
appropriate forum for this relief." 70 F.3d 1103, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1995). 
240 See Kulkarni, supra note 147, at 327-38. 
246This is a classic "Catch-22." Support for the position that aliens forcibly brought to the 
United States against their will should not be deemed to be here "illegally" under the immigration 
laws is found in a series of postwar cases that, "'hile acknowledging the right of the government 
to remove the aliens, found they had not "entered" as illegal immigrants because they had not 
"departed" from a foreign port as required by the Immigration and Nationality Act in its 
definition of "immigrant." In Bradl£)' v. Watkins, the court stated, "[tlhe immigration acts, we 
submit, deal with aliens who are voluntarily seeking to enter the United States." 163 F.2d 328, 
330 (2d Cir. 1947); see also United States ex reI Pateau v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(alien seized and brought to the United States for internment as an enemy alien cannot be 
deported as an "immigrant" until he has been afforded an opportunity to depart mluntarily). 
Nonetheless, these cases also do not impose any requirement that the aliens be deemed to have 
"immigrant" status. 
247This status has been extended to refugees, asylees, conditional entrants, aliens paroled 
into the United States, aliens granted suspension of deportation, Cuban and Haitian entrants 
and applicants for registry to allow them to qualify for federal benefits. See Sharon Carton, The 
PRUCOL Proviso in Public Benefits Law: Alien Eligibility for Public Benefits, 14 NOYA L. REV. 1033, 
1051 (1990). 
In Holley v. Lavine, the Second Circuit required New York state to provide aid to a woman 
who, though not a permanent resident, ,,'as living permanently in the United States "'ith the 
knowledge and permission of the INS. 553 F.2d 845, 851 (2d CiL 1977); see also Berger v. Heckler, 
771 F.2d 1556 (2d CiL1985). But see Esperanza v. Valdez, 612 F. Supp. 241, 244-45 (D. Col. 1985) 
(requiring specific grant of status). 
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that the government was not only aware that the Japanese Latin Alneri-
cans were in the country, but had forced them to come, it would seem 
that they should be granted a similar status.24~ As the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said in United States v. Toscan-
ino, courts should "be guided by the underlying principle that the 
government should be denied the right to exploit its own illegal con-
duct."2~9 There is no precedent, however, requiring the government to 
treat the Japanese Latin Americans as residents; that remains at the 
government's discretion. 
The Fifth Amendment equal protection argument is even harder 
to make. Ironically, the standard for governmentally-imposed race-
based classifications was first articulated in Korematsu, where the Su-
preme Court held that such classifications must be subjected to "the 
most rigid scrutiny. "2,,0 There, of course, the Court decided that the 
internment of all persons of Japanese descent was not race-based.251 In 
the Mochizuki case, the Japanese Latin Americans cannot say that a 
racial distinction is being made between them and the Japanese Ameri-
cans who are receiving reparations; they must argue that the distinction 
constitutes national origin discrimination.252 This is difficult for several 
reasons. Most obviously, both groups are of Japanese national origin-
the very reason they were interned.253 Likewise, challenging the Act as 
unlawful discrimination based on citizenship is futile because internees 
covered by the CLA include both U.S. and Japanese citizens, and those 
~48The possibility of extending PRUCOL status to the Japanese Peruvians is discussed by 
Kulkarni, supra note 147, at 332-35. 
~49 United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (1974) (refusing to exercise federal criminal 
jurisdiction oyer an Italian defendant who had been kidnapped in Uruguay, tortured in Brazil, 
drugged and brought to the United States for trial) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471,488 (1963». 
t5U Korematslt, 323 U.S. at 216. 
251Id. at 223; see also sltpra note 224 and accompanying text. As Bannai and Minami point 
out, the Supreme Court denied the connection between race and exclusion, and then justified 
exclusion on the basis of a race-based affinity Japanese Americans were presumed to have. See 
Lorraine K. Bannai & Dale Minami, Internment During Wmld War II and Litigations, in ASIAN 
AMERICA:-IS AND THE SUPREME COURT 755, 774 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992). 
2,,2 See Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike, sltpra note 141, at 326-30 (discussing the shortcom-
ings of national origin discrimination law as a remedy for discrimination against those perceived 
as "foreign"). 
25:1 In Jacobs 11. Barr, 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1991), a German American internee brought a 
class action alleging that the Civil Liberties Act's restriction of redress to persons of Japanese and 
Aleutian ancestry was national origin discrimination in yiolation of the Fifth Amendment. The 
court held that he had standing to bring suit, but found that, even if subjected to strict sCl"utiny, 
the statute was constitutional because Congress had "concluded that Japanese Americans were 
detained en masse because of racial prejudice and demagoguery, while German Americans were 
detained in small numbers, and only after indi\'idual hearings about their loyalty." 959 F.2d at 
314. 
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denied coverage include citizens of Japan , the United States, Peru and 
other Latin American countries. 
The Civil Liberties Act distinguishes between those who, at the 
time of internment, had been granted permanent resident status by 
the government, and those who, despite being in INS custody, did not 
have resident status. This distinction, while UI~uSt, is probably lawful. 
Ever since the Supreme Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
18822:'4 in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,2c.5 the courts have ruled 
consistently that the government has plenary power over immigration, 
i.e., the right to exclude almost any individual or group from the 
country.25G With respect to restrictions on the entrance of non-citizens 
into the country and the subsequent determination of when they are 
"legally present," the courts have almost completely abdicated judicial 
review of legislation or administrative action.25i 
Congress provided compensation to Japanese Americans as a mat-
ter of discretion. Accordingly, there need only be a rational basis 
for the distinctions made in the legislation. In addition, considerable 
precedent authorizes distinguishing between people on the basis of 
citizenship or immigration status when the benefit at issue constitutes 
a privilege as opposed to a right.2.'iH As a result, it is extremely difficult 
to make a compelling legal argument that the failure to include Japa-
nese Latin Americans under the Civil Liberties Act constitutes national 
origin discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee 
of due process.259 Domestic law, as currently enforced, thus provides 
no effective avenues for redress. 
254 Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (banning all further Chinese immigration to the 
United States). 
255 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
206 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten Afore }pan of Plenm), Power: Immigration, Congress, and the 
Courts, 22 HASTINGS CaNST. L.Q. 925 (1995); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a 
Century of Plenary Powe!: Phantom Constitutional Norms and StatutOlJ Inte1jJretatiol1, 100 YALE LJ. 
545 (1990). 
This plenary power was used to justify holding Ignatz Mezei indefinitely on Ellis Island when 
he, as a returning permanent resident, was excluded as a security risk. See Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953) (continued detention did not \'iolate any statutory or constitutional 
right). This power, said to be inherent in so\'ereignty, was also the basis on which the courts 
allowed for the indefinite offshore detention of Haitians and Cubans trying to gain political 
asylum in the United States. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (11 th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding detention of Cubans; "[I]ike the court in jean, we find [Mezei] to be controlling"); 
Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d at 969 (upholding the detention of Haitian asylum seekers). 
257 See generally Legomsky, supra note 256; Motomura, supra note 256. 
25RSee, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1967) (,The fact that Congress has provided 
some welfare benefits for citizens does not require it to prO\'ide like benefits for all aliens."). Such 
distinctions are also found in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2260 (codified as amended in 8 U.s.c. § 1612 (1998». 
259For a discussion of the difficulties of applying theories of national origin disC\'imination 
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IV. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS 
International law has emerged from the agreements and practices 
of nation states, and claims under international law can be heard in 
the domestic courts of these states, or by transnational tribunals. This 
Section considers the options, and attendant difficulties, of pursuing 
international claims in U.S. courts as well as in regional and global 
institutions. 
A. International Claims in U.S. Courts 
Generally, international courts or commissions require claimants 
to exhaust domestic remedies.260 This requires bringing the claim in 
the appropriate court of the nation with jurisdiction over the violation, 
and pursuing it until (a) there is a final judgment and all appeals have 
been exhausted, or (b) it is apparent that further pursuit of the claim 
is futile. 26! Therefore, claims against the U.S. government should first 
be litigated in U.S. federal courts. 
Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Constitution, the 
laws made pursuant to it and "all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land. "262 As early as 1804, the Supreme Court held that "an 
act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations, if any other possible construction remains."263 In 1900, the 
Supreme Court stated in The Paquete Habana: 
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained 
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate juris-
diction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are 
duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, 
to claims related to perceived "foreignness," see Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike, supra note 141, 
at 326-30. 
260 The American Convention on Human Rights, Article 46(1) (a) states that a )'eqllirement 
of admission of a petition or communication is that "the remedies under domestic law have been 
punmed and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. " 
The American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 206; see also European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 V.N.T.S. 221, 
E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No.3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No.5, E.T.S. 55 and Protocol No.8, 
E.T.S. 118 (,'The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have 
been exhausted, according to the generally recognized rules of international law .... "). 
~61 See FRANK C. NEWMAN & DAVID V.'EISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, 
POLICY, AND PROCESS 48 (1990). 
262U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
263Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (quoting MUl'ray v. The Schooner Charming 
Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, ll8 (1804)). 
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where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of 
these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years 
of labor, research and experience, hm'e made themselves 
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they 
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for 
the speculations of their authors concerning what the law 
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law 
really is.264 
327 
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States says that "[i]nternational law is law like other law, 
promoting order, guiding, restraining, regulating behavior .... It 
is part of the law of the United States, respected by Presidents and 
Congresses, and by the States, and given effect by the courts. "2G5 
Nonetheless, our legal system allows international law to be super-
seded by domestic law.266 Some nations consider domestic law and 
international law to be part of a unified system which acknowledges 
international law as the highest law of the land. In such jurisdictions, 
if domestic laws or judicial decision run counter to international law, 
they will be "trumped" by the latter. Article 25 of the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, states that "[t]he gen-
eral rules of public in ternationallaw are an in tegral part offederallaw. 
They shall take precedence over the laws and shall directly create rights 
and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory. "2G7 
In contrast, the U.S. judicial system regards domestic law and 
international law as independent. The courts attempt to enforce both, 
where possible, and seek to interpret domestic law in a manner com-
patible with international law. Where an irreconcilable conflict exists, 
and Congress has evinced an intent to supersede international law, the 
courts have adopted a "last in time" rule, enforcing later-enacted do-
264 175 U.S. at 700 (citing Hilton \'. Guyot, 159 U.S. 1I3, 163, 164, 214, 215). Bllt see Stanford 
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (rejecting international norms and upholding the constitution-
ality of capital punishment for juveniles). 
265 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGI-: RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, SlIl)/'{/ 
note 179, Introduction; see also Filartiga v. Pe'-la-Irala, 630 F.2d 871,876 (1980) ("Upon ratification 
of the Constitution, the thirteen former colonies were fused into a single nation, one \\'hich, in 
its relations with foreign states, is bound both to observe and construe the accepted norms of 
international law, formerly known as the lall' of nations."). 
266 See ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LA'" COURSEBOOK 261-64 (1994) (discussing 
theories of "monism" and "dualism" in the application of international law in U.S. courts). 
267Id. at 263. 
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mestic legislation even if it violates international law.268 Unilateral ab-
rogation of international agreements or customary international law 
is not, of course, recognized as legitimate under international law. The 
result is that our domestic rule allows the governmen t to consciously 
violate international law without necessarily violating domestic law. 
In Garcia-Mir v. Meese, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit held that detained Cuban refugees from the Mariel 
boatlift who had not been "admitted" under immigration law but 
specially "paroled" into the country, did not have a right to parole 
revocation hearings.269 The court stated, "The public law of nations was 
long ago incorporated into the common law of the United States. To 
the extent possible, courts must construe American law so as to avoid 
violating principles of public international law. "270 Acknowledging that 
the United States' indefinite detention of aliens in this case was a 
violation of international law, the court nonetheless allowed it to con-
tinue. 
If international law is to have any meaning, there must be places 
where claims under such law will be adjudicated. As recognized in The 
Paquete Habana, international law is supposed to be enforced by do-
mestic courts. U.S. courts comprise one of the most efficient and 
effective systems in the world. In addition, it is generally necessary to 
raise international law claims in U.S. courts because domestic remedies 
must be exhausted before going to an international forum. Federal 
courts, however, are often reluctant to enforce international law claims 
and sometimes threaten lawyers with sanctions for frivolous litigation, 
making litigators hesitant to raise such claims.271 
268 This means that if a domestic law is enacted which conflicts with pre-existing international 
law-a u'eaty the United States has ratified, perhaps-the courts presume that Congress intended 
that result, and will uphold the domestic law as long as it is within the limits of the Constitution, 
As the district court explained in United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization: 
Under our constitutional system, statutes and treaties are both the supreme law of 
the land, and the Constitution sets forth no order of precedence, , .. Wherever 
possible, both are to be given effect .... Only where a treaty is irreconcilable with 
a later enacted statute and Congress has clearly evinced an intent to supersede a 
treaty by enacting a statute does the later enacted statute take precedence. 
695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the United Nations Headquarters Agree-
ment was not superseded by the Anti-Terrorism Act). 
269 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986). The coun noted, however, that "public international 
law is controlling only 'whel'e there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or 
judicial decision.'" Id. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700). 
27°Id. (citing RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF UNITED STATES, supra note 179, 
§ 131 ClUt. d, draft no. 6 (1985». 
271 Attorney sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 wel'e imposed on plaintiffs' 
council for raising allegedly frivolous claims in Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
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A significant step toward the recognition of customary and con-
ventional international law can be seen in cases recently litigated under 
the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act,272 which confers federal jurisdiction 
over civil actions by aliens for torts committed "in violation of the law 
of nations."273 In Filartiga v. Pena-lrala,274 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized customary international law 
as part of federal common law and reviewed a broad range of in terna-
tionallaw sources in determining that torture by governmental officials 
is now prohibited by the law of nations. 2i5 Since then, a number of 
human rights violations have been successfully prosecuted under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act. 276 U.S. courts are criticized, however, for enforc-
ing these international standards against other governments, but not 
against the United States. According to Mark Gibney, 
[In] suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign state actors [] 
U.S. domestic courts have provided a vital forum for individu-
als seeking some measure of justice against those responsible 
for committing heinous crimes. Yet these same courts have 
a suit brought by and on behalf of wounded and deceased victims of the 1986 U.S. bombing of 
residential areas on Benghazi and Tripoli, Libya. See Anthony D'Amato, The Imposition of Attorney 
Sanctions for Claims Arising from the U.S. Air Raid on Libya, 84 ~I. J. INT'L L. 705, 706 (1990) 
("The imposition of sanctions casts a st'rious chilling t'ffect upon all attornt'ys who t'ngage in 
intt'rnational human rights litigation."). Sanctions ""t'rt' also sought by the gO\'t'rnment in Haitian 
Centers Council, Inc. 11. McNar)', 789 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y 1992), a cast' challt'nging tht' policy 
of dt'taining Haitian rt'fugees and refusing to allow them acct'ss to legal council t'ven aftt'r tht'y 
had been found to have a crt'diblt' fear of persecution. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Human Face 
of the Haitian Interdiction Program, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 485 (1993) (" [T] he gmwnment ... 
dt'mandt'd that we post a $10,000,000 bond .... Rule 11 sanctions run against both the c1it'nts 
and the lawyers personally, which gm"e us considt'rable conct'rn."); see also Rule 11 Report: Bush 
Administration Accused of Seelling Sanctions for Political PllIjJoses, 6 INSIDE LITIG. 15 (1992). 
272 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994). 
273ld. 
274 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
275 See id.; see also Jeffrey Blum & Ralph Steinhardt, Federal jwisdiction 01lfr International 
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claillls Act After Filartiga '". Pefia-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L LJ. 
53 (1981). 
276The Alit'n Tort Claims Act has been uSt'd in a number of cast's. See, e.g., Abt'bt';./ira v. 
Negt'wo, 72 F.3d 844 (lIth Cir. 1996) (claims against Ethiopian police official for cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (suit against self-pro-
claimed president of Bosnian-Serb t'ntity for murder, rape and other war crimes); Estate of 
Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) (suit against 
former head of Filipino police and military for kidnapping, torture and death); Xuncax v. 
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (suit against Guatemalan general for torture and 
murder); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (suit against formt'r ht'ad of Haitian 
military); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified 694 F. Supp. 707 
(N.D. Cal. 1988) (claims against former Argentine general for torture, murder and prolonged 
arbitrary detention). 
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given a much different reception to foreign plaintiffs who 
allege that the U.S. government itself is responsible for the 
commission of human rights abuses. In one suit after another, 
foreigners who have been harmed by the pursuit of U.S. 
foreign policy have had their claims dismissed by a panoply 
of revolving defenses.277 
As a result, it is still an uphill battle to introduce international law 
into domestic litigation.278 Paul Hoffman refers to the judicial skep-
ticism encountered when trying to introduce customary interna-
tionallaw as the "blank stare phenomenon," calling it the "thresh-
old problem" of using international law in domestic litigation. As 
Naomi Roht-Arriaza states: 
Although the application of international human rights law 
in U.S. courts remains far from commonplace, the exclusion 
of individual rights ... is definitively a relic of the past. ... 
The challenge now is to educate both domestic advocates and 
judges as to the usefulness and applicability of [international 
law] so that judges routinely consider international law-based 
arguments with the same ease they consider constitutional or 
statutory ones.279 
27il\Iark Gibney, Human Rights Litigation ill U.S. Courts: A Hypocritical Approach, 3 BUFF.]. 
INT'L L. 261 (1996-97) (citing Saltany Y. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989» (suit for damages 
from U.S. and British bombing of Libyan cities); McFarland \'. Cheney, 1991 WL 43262 (D.D.C. 
1991), aff'd 971 F.2d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (suit on behalf of ci,ilians injured, killed or suffering 
property damage as a result of the U.S. invasion of Panama); Nejad \'. United States, 724 F. Supp. 
753 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (seeking damages for the downing ofa commercial Iranian airliner by U.S. 
missiles, killing all passengers and crew); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 586 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 
1983), aff'd 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (suing the United States for its support of terrorist 
activities by the Contras in Nicaragua). 
27~ Paul L. Hoffman, The "Blanh Stare Phenomenon": Proving Customary International Law in 
U.S. Courts, 25 GA.]' INT'L & COMPo L. 181, 182 (1995-96). On the difficulties in and importance 
of introducing international human rights law into domestic litigation, see generally Berta 
Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Building Blidges: Blinging International Human Rights Home, 9 LA 
RAZA LJ. 69 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ. 2347 
(1991); Henry J. Richardson III, Gulf Ctisis and African-A merican Interests Under International 
Law, 87 A~I.J. INT'L L. 42 (1993); Natsu Taylor Saito, Crossing the Border: The Interdependence of 
Foreign Policy and Racial justice in the United States, 1 YALE J. DEV. & HUM. RTs. 4 (1998) 
[hereinafter Crossing the BOIderJ. 
279Naomi Roht-Arriaza, International Human Rights Law in United States COltrts: Professor 
. Riesel/feld's Contliblltions, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 601 (1997); see also Nadine 
Strossen, Recent U.S. and Intemationaljudicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal 
Process Anal)'sis and Proposed S)'Ilthesis, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 805 (1990) (emphasizing the need to 
incorporate international human rights norms into domestic law). 
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B. Through Regional and Global Organizations-o.A.S. and u.N. 
Persons who have suffered violations of international law and who 
have exhausted available domestic remedies can bring their claims to 
regional or global organizations. The Japanese Latin Americans' claims 
would be most appropriately brought to the Organization of American 
States' ("OAS") Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or to 
the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights. 
As a member of the OAS, the United States is bound by the OAS 
Charter.2Ho The same 1948 diplomatic conference that adopted the 
Charter also proclaimed the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, which catalogues civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights and duties.281 Although the Declaration was a non-bind-
ing resolution,282 it has come to be regarded as the authoritative inter-
pretation of the "fundamental rights" referred to in the Charter.283 The 
OAS's Inter-American Commission on Human Rights performs coun-
try studies and on-site investigations, and receives and acts on individ-
ual petitions and inter-state communications. There is an American 
Convention on Human Rights and an Inter-American Court which 
hears cases brought under the Convention,2H4 but the United States has 
not ratified the Convention.285 Nonetheless, as an OAS member, the 
United States is bound by the Declaration, and the Inter-American 
Commission has jurisdiction to hear claims based on the Declaration. 281i 
2800rganization of American States Charter, Apr. 30, 1948,2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361; 
amended effective 1970, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847. 
281 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, O.A.S. Off. Rec. 
OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965). Among other rele\'ant provisions, Article I provides that "[e]\'e1Y 
human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person;" Article V says that 
"[elvery person has the right to the protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor, 
his reputation, and his private and family life;" Article VIII says that "[t'lvt'ry pt'rson has tht' right 
to fix his rt'sidenct' within the territory of the state of which he is a national, to move about fret'ly 
within such territory, and not to kaye it except by his O\\'n will;" and Articlt' XX\, provides that 
"[nlo person may be deprived of his liberty except in the cases and according to the procedures 
established by pre-existing law." Id. 
282 See Thomas Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69 
AM.]. INT'L L. 828, 829 (1975). 
283 See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 180 (2d t'd. 1995). 
284 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 206. The Intt'r-American Court of 
Human Rights is established by Chaptt'r \·11 of the Convention. See id. 
285 BUERGENTHAL, supra note 283, at 194--95. 
286 See Richard]. Wilson, Researching the jlllisprudeuce of the Intn'Amflican Commission on 
Human Rights: A Litigat(ff's PerspectilJe, 10 Al\1. U.]. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1994); see also Kam 
Nakano, supra note 147, at 20-25 (arguing that U.S, refusal to hear the claims ofjapant'st' Latin 
Amt'ricans is an ongoing violation of the American Declaration of Rights and Dutit's of Man). 
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Because the United States' internment of Japanese Peruvians pre-
dated the OAS Charter its actions cannot be said to have violated the 
Charter or the Declaration. The U.S. government's ongoing refusal to 
compensate the victims, however, may well violate the Declaration.287 
Thus, when domestic remedies for these claims have been exhausted, 
the Japanese Latin American internment cases could be brought be-
fore the Inter-American Commission with a request that the Commis-
sion find the United States responsible for full redress. 
Options also exist within the United Nations structure. As a U.N. 
member, the United States is a party to the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice ("ICJ"}.288 The ICJ hears cases arising under interna-
tionallaw, but only has contentious jurisdiction over states which have 
accepted that jurisdiction.289 Dissatisfied with the IC]'s handling of a 
case brought by Nicaragua against the United States for mining its 
territOlial waters, attacking ports and other facilities and financing and 
training the "Contra" forces to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, 
the United States withdrew its consent to compulsory ICJ jurisdiction 
in 1986.290 To the extent that it is a party to treaties that so provide, the 
The Commission has heard claims brought by individuals against the United States. In 1998 
it ruled that the United States had violated William Andrews' rights under the Declaration to life, 
to equality before the law without regard to race, to an impartial hearing and to be free from 
cruel, infamous or unusual punishment. See Organization of American States, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 57/96, Case 11.139, United States, 
OEA/ser/L./V./I1.98, doc. 7.rev. (Feb. 19, 1998) (on file with authOl·). Andrews had been 
executed by the state of Utah despite significant evidence of racism in the proceedings, including 
an incident in which ajuror handed the bailiff at trial a napkin on which "hang the niggers" was 
written. Id. at 39-40; see Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 920 (1988) (Marshall, J. dissenting 
from denial of certiorari); Capital Punishment on the 25th Anniversary of Furman v. Geurgia, A 
Report by the Southern Center for Human Rights 5 (1997) (reproducing the note). While such 
judgments are difficult to enforce against the United States, they have significant impact on how 
other nations pelTeive the United States and bring some pressure on the United States to comply 
with international law. . 
287The U.S.'s actions in interning the Japanese Latin Americans would now be prohibited 
by Articles I (life, liberty and secUlity), II (equality before the law without distinction as to race), 
V (protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his private and family life), VI (protection 
of the family), VIII (right to fix residence within the tenitory of the state of which he is a national, 
to move freely within the territory, and not to leave it except by his own will), IX (inviolability of 
his home), XIV (right to remuneration for work), XVII (basic civil rights), XVIII (courts to protect 
from acts of authority that violate fundamental constitutional rights), XIX (right to nationality), 
XXIII (right to own private property), XXV (no deprivation of liberty except through pre-existing 
legal procedures), and XXVI (right to an impartial and public hearing). 
2MM Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 150. All members of the United 
Nations are parties to the Statute by virtue of Article 93 of the U.N. Charter. 
289 See id. art. 34(1). 
290 See Milital'y and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27); Military 
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 392 (Nov. 26); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & 
HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 81 (2d ed. 1990); United States: Department of 
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U.S. is still subject to ICj jurisdiction.29 \ Nonetheless, the United States 
continues to disregard unfavorable rulings. For example, in April 1998, 
ignoring a stay of execution requested by the ICj, the United States 
allowed the execution of Angel Breard, a Paraguayan national who had 
been convicted of murder without having access to Paraguayan consu-
lar officials-a violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions.292 
Because no treaties confer jurisdiction in the Japanese Peruvian 
case and the ICJ can only hear cases brought by states parties, the ICJ 
is not an option for the Japanese Latin Americans. 2!'3 Such situations, 
however, can be brought to the world's attention by presenting them 
to the United Nation's Commission on Human Rights294 and its Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities.295 In March 1998, Karen Parker of International Educational 
Development submitted a report concerning the Japanese Latin 
American internment to the 54th session of the Commission on Hu-
man Rights. It said, in part: 
At the time this program was in operation, international 
humanitarian law clearly forbade war-time abduction, incar-
ceration, and deportation of civilians from friendly countries. 
Exchange of civilians from a friendly country to an enemy 
third party was viewed as especially serious and in this case, 
met the criteria of hostage-taking. International law also for-
bade slavery and forced labour (the conditions of the Latin 
Americans held in the Panama camps clearly met the then-
existing prohibitions against slavery and forced labour) 
State Letter and Statement concerning Termination of Acceptance of I. CJ Comp"lso1')'lll1isdiction, 24 
INT'L LEG. MAT. 1742 (1985). 
291 See Statute of International Coun of Justice, slljJra note 150, art. 36(1). 
292 See Philippe Sands, Perspectil1e on International Law: An Execution Heard ROllnd the l,,"ol1d, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16,1998, at B9; Editorial, ExeClltiol1 in l'irginia Killing Should Halle Been Sta),ed, 
SYRACUSE HERALD AMERICAN, Apr. 19, 1998, at D2. 
293 Statute ofInternational Court of Justice, supra note 150, art. 34(1). 
294 This body was created by the United Nations' Economic and Social Council in compliance 
with the UN ChaneI', Article 68. See generall)' Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 126 (Philip Alston, ed., 1992). 
295The Commission and Sub-Commission have created \mrking groups and ha\'e appointed 
special rapporteurs to investigate allegations of systematic human rights \'iolations and special 
procedures for hearing complaints regarding "gross \'iolations" of human rights. ECOSOC Res. 
728F (XXVIII), U.N. ESCOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No.1, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/3290 (1959) (allowing 
Commission to compile communications about human rights violations); ECOSOC Res. 1235 
(XLII), U.N. ESCOR, 42nd Sess., Supp. No. I, at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967) (allowing 
examination of allegations of gross violations of human rights); and ECOSOC Res. 1503 (XLVIII), 
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. lA, at 8, U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add.l (1970) (allowing the appointment of 
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whether in peacetime or in war. The Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal (Nuremberg charter), the Charter of 
the Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo charter) and the 
earlier Control Council Law 10 set out these acts as war crimes 
and crimes against humanity at the time of World War IJ.296 
While the Commission lacks enforcement powers, it can bring con-
siderable pressure to bear on states and can aid in raising public 
awareness of violations of international law. Whether it will be suc-
cessful in this case remains to be seen. 
To summarize, avenues are available for pursuing international 
claims such as those of the interned Japanese Peruvians, but each is 
accompanied by significant problems. Generally speaking, the U.S. 
judicial system is relatively effective and well-organized, but it is reluc-
tant to enforce international law.297 International courts and commis-
sions, specifically created to hear international claims, are difficult to 
access, slow to respond and lack enforcement power. Although such 
international bodies can be invaluable in bringing international atten-
tion to violations of law, domestic courts remain the best hope for 
effective remedies.298 
V. TOWARD COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Even as one reflects on certain events oj the 1940s and 1950s and 
concludes that they were unnecessary militarily, inept politically, 
and inhumane socially, it is no consolation that they are part oj 
the dead past in which the Alien Act oj 1798, President Roosevelt's 
Executive Order 9066, General De Witt s orders on our West Coast, 
and Ambassador Norweb's program in Peru Jostered gross abuse 
oj elementary human rights. The uncertain Juture that precipitates 
other tense and Jear-laden moments may unJortunately find Ameri-
can law, an American president, the American military, and 
American diplomats equally able and willing to violate the human 
rights oj innocent men, women and children. 
-Harvey Gardiner, Pawns in a Triangle of Hate 299 
working groups to study situations). The use of these procedures in connection with the case of 
Korean women subjected to sexual slavery by the Japanese dming ""orld ""ar II is described in 
Parker & Chew, supra note 149. 
2!16 Submission of International Educational Development, Mar. 1998 (on file with author). 
297 See Strossen, supra note 279. 
298 See Jordan Paust, Threats to Accountability After Nuremberg: Crimes Against Humanity, 
Leader RRspollsibility and National Fora, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 547 (1995) (describing the 
need for national courts to enforce international norms). 
2\)9 GARDINER, supra note 7, at 176. This is the conclusion reached by Gardiner, the only 
historian to thoroughly document the Japanese Peruvian internment. 
December 1998] 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 275 335 
While the Japanese Latin American internment may not involve 
large numbers of people, it is a case of significant import. A well-
defined episode with relatively undisputed facts, it provides a clear 
example of how international law is incorporated into-or ignored 
by-our legal and governmental structures. It shows how considera-
tions of human rights and international law can be lost in the foreign 
policy decisions of U.S. authorities and how the legal system fails to 
rectiry such actions. It also illustrates the harm that can be done when 
international law is not taken seriously-harm to innocent individuals, 
to the national interest of the United States and to the rule of law 
globally. This Section considers the costs of ignoring international law 
in the Japanese Peruvian case, and makes two recommendations for 
addressing these problems: first, that remedies for such violations be 
made available by enforcing international law in domestic courts; and 
second, that the branches of government responsible for foreign policy 
make structural changes to institutionalize awareness of, and ensure 
compliance with, international law and human rights norms. 
A. Repercussions oj Ignoring International Law 
The Japanese Peruvian internment resulted not so much from the 
malevolent designs of particular individuals, but from a convergence 
of perceived interests on the part of the Peruvian and U.S. govern-
ments. Within the executive branch of the U.S. government there were 
varying perceptions, motivations and expectations that this particular 
program would further U.S. interests.3W) U.S. authorities in the Depart-
ments of War, State and Justice were interested in promoting "hemi-
spheric security" and in accommodating Peruvian anti:Japanese hostil-
ity in order to obtain the cooperation of the Peruvian government. 
The primary motivation for interning the Japanese Latin Americans, 
however, was to accumulate hostages to exchange for Americans held 
in Japanese-occupied territories. 
The U.S. holding of hostages turned out to be not only unneces-
sary, but counterproductive in a number of ways. First, the U.S. report-
edly rejected a proposal from the Japanese government to exchange 
all civilians without regard to numbers, and began negotiating one-for-
one exchanges that stalled when the Japanese government insisted on 
the repatriation of designated individuals. Not only did the U.S. and 
Peruvian lists of proposed deportees not agree, but often neither list 
included the individuals requested by the Japanese government. 30] The 
300 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
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program of forced deportation and incarceration thus not only failed 
to release American internees but may, in fact, have helped bring the 
larger exchange program to a halt. As noted above, the Japanese 
government withdrew from the negotiations for a third exchange after 
lodging protests about the kidnapping of Japanese Latin Americans 
and the treatment of Japanese Americans, particularly those interned 
at Tule Lake.302 While the reasons for the Japanese withdrawal are not 
clearly documented, it is reasonable to infer that the Japanese govern-
ment would resist participating in exchanges which gave the United 
States further incentive to kidnap Japanese nationals from third coun-
tries. Thus, it appears that by engaging in these blatant violations of 
international law, the United States subverted the very ends it hoped 
to achieve. 
Second, the holding of Japanese Latin American and Japanese 
American hostages in internment camps did not protect Americans 
held by the Japanese military. There are various references to a "repri-
sal reserve" designed to ensure humane treatment of American intern-
ees,31J3 but in fact the poor physical conditions of the U.S. camps made 
State Department officials fear reprisals against the Americans held 
overseas.3lH 
Third, if increased hemispheric security was an expected benefit 
of the internment program that, too, failed to materialize. As John 
Emmerson's memoirs~\1J5 and the files combed by Harvey Gardiner306 so 
clearly illustrate, embassy officials found no evidence of sabotage or 
subversive activity by the Japanese in Peru. Until Raymond Ickes was 
sent to Lima to participate in the selection process, those chosen by 
U.S. authorities were not even identified as "dangerous."307 After Ickes 
insisted on this criterion, there was still no evidence of subversive 
activity by any Japanese Peruvians, so men were labeled "dangerous" 
simply by virtue of having been community leaders.30s Moreover, even 
after screening procedures were implemented, only a small fraction of 
those actually deported were on the U.S. lists. U.S. officials were under 
no illusion, even as the process was taking place, that the deportations 
did anything to promote hemispheric security. 
3"2 See supra uotes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
3"3 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
304 See supra notes 92-93, 106-11 and accompanying text. 
305 See generally EMMERSON, supra note 7. 
306 See generally GARDINER, supra note 7. 
30; See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text. 
308 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
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There is thus no evidence that any of the anticipated benefits were 
achieved by the actions of the U.S. government. There were, however, 
numerous costs. Most obvious, of course, are the losses suffered by the 
Japanese Peruvians and other interned Japanese Latin Americans. As 
described in Section II, they lost homes, businesses, property and 
generations of personal belongings and connections. Most could not 
return to their homes in Peru and had to construct new li,'es in a 
war-devastated Japan where they had few ties and were often regarded 
as outsiders. 309 Those who were able to remain in the United States 
lived for years in uncertainty and fear. 310 
Significant costs were also incurred by the United States govern-
ment. Some of these were fiscal. The United States assumed the entire 
cost of transporting over 2,000 people from Latin America, and then 
guarding, feeding, and housing them for years. Transport ships, mili-
tary personnel and other precious resources were devoted to this 
entirely unproductive end.311 The contemporaneous costs to the 
United States were not, however, limited to material costs. The inter-
national credibility of the country was harmed when, for example, the 
U.S. actions with respect to Japanese Americans were raised as a de-
fense by German and Japanese being prosecuted at the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals.312 
The United States has accrued ongoing costs as well. By refusing 
to compensate the victims,3I3 the government has incurred the liability 
under international law to do so. The settlement in the Mochizuki case 
only requires the government to pay five miIlion dollars or less in 
redress.314 The plaintiffs sought compensation equivalent to that af-
forded interned Japanese Americans under the terms of the Civil 
Liberties Act, which would cost approximately twenty-four million dol-
lars. In addition, the government owes the internees compensation for 
the property they lost, for the lives disrupted, for the iIlnesses and 
deaths attributable to the internment.3I5 It owes them this plus fifty 
years worth of interest. Taking only inflation into account, the $5000 
309 See generall)' WEGLYN, supra note II. 
310 See generally GARDINER, supra note 7; HIGASHIDE, supra note 7. 
311 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
312 See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text. 
313 See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text. 
314 The Japanese Perm'ian Oral History Project estimates that there may be 1200 JLA intern-
ees still living, but the current proposed settlement would only pay them $5000 apiece until the 
already-allocated funds under the CLA nm out. \O\1lile this amount is not certain, it will definitely 
be inadequate. Therefore, I have projected that 1000 internees might recei,'e redress under the 
settlemen t. 
3100ne internee, Henry Shima, has filed suit for $10 million in personal damages. See 
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now being offered each internee is the equivalent of about $550 in 
1945. At an interest rate of 6%, it represents about $242 in 1945.316 
vVhile one cannot begin to calculate the actual damages incurred by 
the Japanese Latin Americans, it is clear that the amount required to 
fully compensate them under international law is enormous. 
The possibility of having to compensate the victims is probably the 
least significant of the ongoing costs incurred by the United States in 
this case. The plight of the Japanese Latin Americans has slowly been 
coming to the attention of the American public and the international 
community. Testimony about the Japanese Peruvian internment was 
presented to the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment 
of Civilians and resulted in acknowledgment of the program in the 
Commission's final report. 317 Testimony about the war crimes commit-
ted by the United States, and the need for redress, has been presented 
to the United Nations' Commission on Human Rights.318 International 
attention has been paid to the Mochizuki case and will be paid to the 
cases which are being filed by plaintiffs who opted out of the settle-
ment. 3J9 In short, the matter is now before the court of international 
opinion. 
Compensation for the victims of World War II war crimes became 
a topic of widespread interest in 1998. In August Swiss banks and Holo-
caust victims agreed to a $1.25 billion settlement of a suit filed in U.S. 
district court charging the Swiss banks with laundering gold looted by 
the Nazis32u and, under threat of suit, Volkswagen agreed in July to 
compensate those who had been forced to perform slave labor in its 
japanese Latin American Files Lawsuit for Full Redress, JAPAN POL'y & POL., Aug. 31, 1998, available 
in 1998 "VL 8032249. 
:l16This is the approximate interest rate of lO-year treasury bills for the period of 1945 to 
1998. At 6% interest, $242 in 1945 would be $5,008 in 1998. AAA corporate bonds, all maturities, 
averaged 6.7% interest between 1945 and 1996. At this rate, $172 in 1945 would yield $5,001 in 
1998. Using the very conservative measure of 3-month treasury bills, the average interest since 
1945 is 4.8%, at which rate $437 in 1945 would yield $5,003 today. These figures are from the 
Economic Report of the President (1997), Council of Economic Advisors, Table D-71, Bond Yields 
and Interest Rates, 1929-1996 at 382 available at <http://www.gpo.ucop.edu/catalog/-
erp97.html> (visited Mar. 26, 1999). I am grateful to Peter Philips, Professor of Economics, 
University of Utah, for obtaining this information and making these calculations. 
317 See COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION, supra note 213, App. D (testimony of Seiichi 
Higashide); see also JUSTICE DELo\YED, supra note 222, at 8. 
'llti See supra note 296 and accompanying text. 
319 See SIlpra notes 7, 13 and accompanying text. 
3~O See Michael Hirsch, After 50 Yean, A Deal Swiss Banks Agree to l'v1ake Payments to Holocaust 
"ictims, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1998, at 41; Switzerland Hopes Holocaust Settlement Clears Ait; DALLAS 
MOR"-'ING NEWS, Aug. 14, 1998, at llA. The Swiss banks are criticized for following an "ethic of 
the least effort" and neglecting to distinguish looted gold from other gold. Victim Gold, STAR-
TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), May 26, 1998, at 03A. 
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factories during World War 11.321 Based on a 200-page report issued by 
a U.S. commission headed by Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat, 
an eighteen billion dollar lawsuit has been filed against two German 
banks.322 In April a Japanese court ordered the Japanese government 
to pay reparations to three Korean women who had been used as sex 
slaves, and a group representing "comfort women" got a bill intro-
duced in the U.S. Congress calling for an apology and reparations from 
Japan.323 This issue has also been presented to the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights324 and some propose that the newly 
formed International Criminal Court should deal with the question of 
compensation for the "comfort women."325 
The U.S. government has been a m~or player in recent repara-
tions movements, particularly those concerning compensation for gold 
and artwork taken by the Nazis. 321i The United States' position, however, 
appears hypocritical in the face of its refusal to compensate for the 
Japanese Latin American internment.327 It diminishes U.S. credibility 
and devalues international law in ways we may not fully recognize for 
321 See Paul Geitner, VW Decision May Affect German Firms, AP,July 8, 1998, available in 1998 
WL 6692725; Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, 50 Yean On, the Wages of Slave Labow; TI~IES (London), 
Aug. 10, 1998, at 18. 
In addition, a lawsuit filed in March accuses a German subsidiary of the Ford Motor Company 
with knowingly profiting from forced labor during World War II, and the United States is 
spearheading a drive to identity and ensure compensation for billions of dollars worth of art 
stolen by the Nazis. See Blaine Harden, Suit Alleges Ford Unit Used Forced Labor In IHVlI, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at A04; BaITY Schweid, 39 Nations Seell Art Looted by Nazis, AP, july 1, 1998, 
available in 1998 WL 6689782. 
322 SeeAlex Brummer, Nazi Victims Sue Banks $18bn Claim in Nelli Yod! COllrts, THE GUARDIAN 
(London), june 4, 1998, at 025. 
323 See japan Ordered to Compensate 3 Sex Slaves Lalli, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1998, at A8, available 
in 1998 WL 2422368; Asian Comfort Homen Seek US Sup/Jort for Reparations Demands, AGENCE 
FR.-PRESSE, June 4, 1998, available ill 1998 WL 2295714; see also Estella Duran, In US, Korean 
Woman Details Rapes by japanese in World Hal' II, B. GLOBE,june 5,1998, at A19; Yuri Kageyama, 
japan Must Pa), Ex-WWII Sex Slaves, AP, Apr. 17, 1998, available in 1998 v.'L 6656713.Japan has 
also come under pressure to provide compensation for its slaughter of civilians in Nanking during 
World War II. See IRIS CHANG, RAPE OF NANKING (1998). 
324 See UN: Commission on Human Rights Hears Statements all Role of National Human Rights 
Institutions, M2 PRESS\\'IRE, Apr. 9, 1998, available in 1998 v.'L 11306214. 
325 Farhan Haq, Rights: Intemationaljllstice Neededfor 'Comfort Homen', INTER PRESS SERVICE, 
Mar. 25, 1998, available in 1998 v.'L 5986352. 
326According to Stuart Eizenstat, "[t]his can be a healing process, which can strengthen each 
of our countries and bring this century to a close on a high note of justice. " Sclm"eid, 5llpra note 
321. 
327 As an editorial in the SI. Petersburg Times said about the japanese Latin American 
internment, "[t]his outrageous episode weakens our moral authority to wag an accusatory finger 
at Switzerland for not accounting for Nazi gold, or at Japan for its failure to compensate the 
South Korean 'comfort women' it conscripted into sexual slavery." Editorial, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES, june 23, 1998, at lOA. 
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years to come. The effectiveness of international law rests on the 
recognition it receives from the governments of the world. When a 
nation as powerful as the United States refuses to abide by its norms, 
the stage is set for other governments and non-governmental groups-
including the "terrorist" organizations frequently denounced by the 
United States-to ignore international law when it suits them. 328 
Ironically, one of the stated purposes of the Civil Liberties Act is 
to "make more credible and sincere any declaration of concern by the 
United States over violations of human rights committed by other 
nations. "~129 The terms of the Mochizuki settlement, however, suggest 
that the mistreatment of these plaintiffs was less significant than that 
of U.S. citizens and residents. Viewed only in quantitative terms, this 
could be dismissed as a small incident in recent history. But it is 
difficult to see how the U.S. government's resolution of the problem 
could be perceived by anyone, inside or outside of the United States, 
as reflecting anything but disdain for international law and human 
rights. As such, it sends a stark message, one that directly contradicts 
the purpose of the Civil Liberties Act and undermines the credibility 
of the United States in protesting violations of international law and 
human rights by other nations. 
B. Proposals for Restructuring 
We are beginning to recognize that the internment of Japanese 
Americans was not an aberration or a product of wartime hysteria, but 
quite consistent with the historical treatment of Asian Americans and 
other racial minorities under the law.330 Similarly, we need to consider 
that the internment of Japanese Latin Americans was not an aberra-
32~ Harold Koh states: "A state's violation of international law creates inevitable frictions and 
contradictions that hinder its ongoing participation within the transnational legal process. When 
the United States denies the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in a suit in which 
it is a defendant, that decision impairs its ability to imoke the court's jurisdiction as a plaintiff." 
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 203-04 (1996); see also 
Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay: Why Do Nations Ob!')1 International Law?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599 
(1997) (describing the process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international 
norms into domestic legal systems). 
329 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988). 
33IJThis history goes from the 1790 Naturalization Act which limited naturalized citizenship 
to "free white persons" to the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act to the Alien Land Laws of the 1920s. 
See HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 3, 37-109 (1996) (describing the history of racial restrictions in 
naturalization law); Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike, supra note 141, at 291-95 (reviewing legal 
restrictions on Asian Americans). See generally Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-
Century "Alien Land Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, in this issue, at 37. For an analysis of the 
interrelationship of racial restrictions and wartime security concerns, see Gil Gott, A Tale of New 
Precedents: Japanese Amnican Internment as Foreign AfFlil'S Law, in this issue, at 179. 
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tion, a mistake made in the turmoil of war, but instead quite consistent 
with the United States' treatment of minorities in the United States as 
well as our neighbors in Latin America. In 1823, in what came to be 
known as the Monroe Doctrine, the United States announced its in-
tentions to be the primary power in the western hemisphere.331 Woo-
drow Wilson's Secretary of State said bluntly, "[iJn its advocacy of the 
Monroe Doctrine, the United States considers its own interests. The 
integrity of the other American nations is an incident, not an end."332 
United States has exhibited its disregard for Latin American na-
tions' sovereignty on numerous occasions. Having failed in its attempts 
to buy Cuba in 1854,333 the United States essentially took control of it 
in 1898, forcing the Cubans to incorporate an amendment into their 
Constitution which gave the United States military bases in Cuba and 
an unrestricted right to intervene in Cuban affairs. 334 The United States 
annexed Puerto Rico in 1898,335 seized the Panama Canal in 1903,3:11; 
and occupied Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1915.33i It sub-
sequently installed governments, often run by dictators like Machado 
in Cuba and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, to do the United 
States' bidding.338 More recent violations of international law in Latin 
America include U.S. support of a 1954 military coup in Guatemala;339 
the CIA-backed overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973;340 and 
the mining of the waters and support of the Contras in Nicaragua.341 
331 ERIC WILLIAMS, FROM COLUMBUS TO CASTRO: THE HISTORY OF THE CARIBBEAN, 1492-
1969, at 411 (1984). This was characterized in 1895 as a ,'iolation of international law by the 
British Foreign Secretary: "[N)o statesman, however eminent, and no nation, ho\\'ever powerful, 
are competent to insert into the code of international law a novel principle which was never 
recognized [sic) before, and which has not since been accepted by the Government of any other 
country." 1d. at 416-17 (quoting a statement of Lord Salisbury, to U.S. Secretary of State Olney 
in 1895). 
332 See genemlly Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alihe, supra note 141, at 268-315. 
333 See WILLIAMS, supra note 331, at 413-14. 
334 See id. at 420-21. 
330 See id. at 420. 
336Eric Williams, former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, characterized the U.S. 
attitude in the seizure of the Panama Canal: "As stated frankly by [President Theodore) Roosevelt 
himself in 1908 with reference to Venezuela, America had to 'show these Dagoes that they will 
have to beha\'e decently.' So Roose\'eltjust 'took' the Panama Canal while Congress and the South 
Americans debated the issue." 1d. at 422; see also Construction of a Ship Canal to Connect the 
Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, Nov. 18, 1903, U.S.-Pan., 33 Stat. 2234, T.S. No. 431. 
337 See WILLIAMS, supm note 331, at 424-25. 
338 As President Franklin Roosevelt said of Tntiillo, "He may be an S.O.B., but he is our 
S.O.B." 1d. at 465. 
339 See NOAM CHOMSKY, YEAR 501: THE CONQUEST CONTINUES 172-74 (1993). 
340 See id. at 189-90. 
341 See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
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In December 1989 approximately 24,000 U.S. troops invaded Panama, 
inflicting significant civilian casualties and destroying entire neighbor-
hoods.3~2 This disregard for international law has, in turn, created 
tension with other nations.3~3 
International law has been violated in these cases both in times of 
war and in times of peace. This means we must be cautious about 
accepting justifications based on "military necessity" and "national 
security." As Eugene Rostow notes, "[ilt is essential to every democratic 
value in society that official action taken in the name of the war power 
be held to standards of responsibility. "344 Especially in times of war, we 
need to protect our civil liberties as well as human rights under inter-
national law. As Nanette Dembitz said about the Korematsu and Endo 
cases, "periods of war and peace are not disconnected eras; the peace-
time social scene emerges from the war-time, and that which might 
emerge as a result of ... such unrestrained military force is a subject 
for apprehension. "345 As we move into an era of military actions marked 
342 General Manuel Noriega, head of the Panamanian state and reportedly on the CIA 
payroll, was arrested by U.S. forces, brought to the United States and put on trial for criminal 
conspiracy to violate U.S. law. See United States v. Noriega, 683 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1988); see 
also Mark Andrew Sherman, An Inquiry Regarding the International and Domestic Legal Problems 
Presented in United States v. Noriega, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 393, 395 (1989) ("Noriega 
represents the ultimate intersection of United States domestic law and foreign policy, and its 
precedential value should not be understated."); John Embry Parkerson, Jr., United States Com-
pliance with Humanitarian Law Respecting Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 MIL. L. REv. 
31 (1991) (noting ambiguity in the justification for the invasion of Panama and arguing that the 
U.S. should hm'e complied fully with the humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict); see also 
Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. j. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 312-13 (1991) ("With regret, I conclude that the invasion of Panama by the 
United States was a clear violation of international law as embodied in the principal norm of the 
U.N. Charter on which the world, under the leadership of the United States, built the new 
international order after World War II. The United States did not even have a color of justification 
for this invasion."). For a justification of the invasion, see Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of 
Panama niH a Lawfid Response to T)'Ianny, 84 fu'\[.j. INT'L L. 516 (1990). 
Id. 
343 Koh, Tmnsnational Legal Process, supm note 328, at 195-96. Koh states: 
[Tlhe Supreme Court held that a Mexican accused's forced abduction by U.S. 
agents ... did not dh'est U.S. courts of criminal jurisdiction to try that defendant. 
Alvarez-Machain sparked intense media criticism and protests from political leaders 
in Mexico, Canada, Europe, and the Caribbean .... The Permanent Council of 
the Organization of American States requested a legal opinion regarding the inter-
national legality of the Supreme Court's decision from the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee, which concluded that "the decision is contrary to the rules of interna-
tional law." 
3H Rostow, supra note 118, at 515. 
345Dembitz, supra note 219, at 238. 
December 1998] 19 B.C. THIRD WORlD LAW JOURNAL 275 343 
by undeclared wars,346 and of declarations of open-ended "wars on 
targets such as drugs, crime or terrorism, we must not lose sight of 
these principles.347 
Accordingly, if the United States is to wage such "wars," we must 
insist that it comply with both domestic and internationallaw.348 Should 
the U.S. violate international law, we must take victims' claims seriously, 
and provide them with a forum for redress. If we fail to do so, we will 
be undermining the rule of law throughout the world. 349 
As a powerful industrialized nation heavily vested in global mar-
kets, the United States strongly desires other nations to comply with 
international law. Government officials have consistently made this 
point with respect to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, its biological and chemi-
cal weapons, and its treatment of the Kurds;%O China's use of prison 
labor and treatment of political dissent;3!il Pakistan's use of child la-
34GThe military conflict in the Gulf "'ar or the recent bombings of Afghanistan and Sudan 
provide examples. See James Risen & David Johnston, Experts Find No Arms Chemicals at Bombed 
Sudan Plant, NY TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at A12. 
347 See generally Mark Andrew Shennan, United States Internatiollal Drug Control Policy, Extra-
dition, and the Rule of Law in Columbia, 15 Nm'A 1. REv. 661 (1991); Peter S. McCarthy, Comment, 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Extending the KelcFrisbie Doet/jne to Meet the Modern Challenges 
Posed by the International Drug Trade, 27 Nnr ENG. 1. RE\·. 1067 (1993). 
348Regarding the importance of international human rights law to protecting the rights of 
minorities within the United States, see generally Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Natives, 
Newcomers and Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the Twent)'-First Cent1l1)" 23 FORDHA~f URBAN 
LJ. 1075 (1996) (discussing the human rights law applicable to alienage discrimination in the 
United States); Natsu Taylor Saito, Crossing the Bordel; supra note 278 (discussing the impact of 
U.S. human rights violations overseas on racial and ethnic minorities in the United States). 
349 See generally Thomas David Jones, The Haitian Refilgee Crisis: A Quest for Human Rights, 
15 MICH.]. INT'L L. 77, 82 (1993) (characterizing the U.S. policy toward Haitian refugees as 
evidence of a "malleable doctrine of universal human rights, subject to the political ,,·hims and 
expediency of the political party in power .... "); Michael Higgins, Loo/dng the Part: With 
Criminal Profiles Being Used More Widely to Sj)ot Possible TenOlists and Drug Cowiers, Claims of 
Bias are Also on the Rise, 83-Nov. A.B.A.]. 48 (1997) (discussing the increase in discrimination 
against Arab Americans resulting from publicity about "terrorism "). 
350 See Scott 1. Silliman, Foreword, Contell/poral), Issues in Controllillg H-eapolls of Mass De-
struction, 8 DUKE]' COMPo & INT'L 1. 1 (noting the international community's frustration at Iraq's 
unwillingness to allow weapons inspections); Proceedings of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, Special Capitol Hill Session; The Gil If War: Collectille Security, nal" Powers alld Laws of 
War, Remarks of Jordan PallSt, 85 AM. SOC'y INT'L 1. PROC. 1, 13-16 (1991) (criticizing Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait as violating the prohibitions against deportation of civilians in the Gene\'a 
COll\'ention of 1949); see also Gavin A. Symes, Note, Force Without Law: Seeking a LegalJustification 
for the Septl'lnber 1996 U.S. Militar)' Intervention in Iraq, 19 MICH.]. INT'L 1. 581 (1998) (discussing 
possible violations of international law in the U,S. intenention to protect the Kurds in Iraq). 
351 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, China Countl)' Report 011 Human Rights Pmrtices for 1997, 
released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Qan. 30, 1998); AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, China: Detention and Harassment of Dissidents and Others Between jan 11(11)' and 
june 1998, AI Index: ASA 17/16/98. 
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bor;352 Taiwan's and China's respect for intellectual property rights353 
and the safety of U.S. embassies and diplomatic personneP54 The U.S. 
cannot assume to promote these interests while adhering to a policy 
of selective compliance with international law. To really participate in 
the development and promotion of the global rule of law we must take 
international law more seriously ourselves.'155 This requires scrupulous 
compliance in large and small matters alike as those governmental 
policies that allow for minor violations will invite major ones. Violations 
of international law, like landmines, may appear small and deeply 
buried, yet it is difficult to know when they will explode and how much 
damage they will do. 356 This problem must be tackled in at least two 
ways: first, by creating viable remedies within our domestic courts 
for violations of international law, and second, by insisting that the 
branches of the government charged with making and implementing 
U.S. foreign policy-Congress and the Executive-take international 
law seriously and create institutional mechanisms to that end. 
According to Anthony D'Amato, "any international lawyer will 
estimate that over 99% of the cases that turn on rules of international 
law are filed in domestic courts."357 As the recent move to organize an 
International Criminal Court demonstrates,358 transnational courts are 
352 See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 1533 (1998) (reviewing HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
(Stephen F. Diamondand & Lance A. Campa, eds., 1998)); Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, 
Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 663 (1997); Timothy P. McElduff, Jr. & Jon Veiga, The Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995: A 
Choice Between Hegemony and HypoClis)" II ST.JOHN'S]' LEGAL COMMENT 581 (1996) (describing 
U.S. efforts to combat child labor practices of other countries); Donica Croot, Taking Aim at 
Soccer Balls AJade in Pakistan, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1996, at 01; Mark Schapiro & Trudie Stegler, 
Childlrtl of a Lesser God: Child Labor in Pakistan, HARPER'S BAZAAR, Apr. 1996, at 204. 
353 See Rosalind M. Parker, Protecting Ame/iean Television Programming in Russia, China, 
Taiwan, and Japan, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 445, 454-64 (1995) (describing copyright 
protection in China and Taiwan). 
354See, f.g., The Diplomatic and Consular Staff Case (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3 (1980) 
(holding that the Iranian government violated international law by allowing the takeover of the 
U.S. embassy and holding the U.S. diplomatic staff hostage). 
355 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Democracy and Human Rights in the United States Foreign 
Policy?: Lessons from the Haitian Clisis, 48 SMU L. REv. 189 (1994) [hereinafter Democracy and 
Human Rights] (evaluating the Clinton Administration's human rights record); Harold Hongju 
Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE LJ. 2391 (1994) (using 
the Haitian refugee cases to illustrate problems with U.S. implementation of human rights 
policies). 
356See, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, lHy Lai and Its Omens, NY TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998, at A27 
(discussing, 30 years after the fact, how the U.S. military'S failure to train its personnel in 
international law contributed to widespread massacres in Vietnam). 
,15i A:'1THONY D'Ar-IATO, supra note 266, at 261. 
3,,~ See genemU)' Christoper Keith Hall, The Sixth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on 
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developing. This is a lengthy process, howe,'er, and justice will not be 
served by waiting for them to become effective. Furthermore, the 
hesitations that many in the United States hm'e about submitting to 
the jurisdiction of international tribunals could be avoided if U.S. 
courts would enforce international law, for those tribunals always re-
quire domestic remedies to be exhausted first. By taking international 
law seriously, federal courts could begin to provide effective remedies 
for violations of international law. This would serve as a deterrent for 
future violations of international law and would greatly increase the 
credibility of the United States in the international legal community.35D 
Providing remedies after the fact, however, is not enough. Having 
litigated many human rights cases, Paul Hoffman laments, "I have 
learned [that] customary law ... really does not restrain executive 
action."36o Improving compliance prospectively is greatly preferable to 
meting out punishment retroacth·ely. There are many ways in which 
this could be done. Despite having been an active participant in their 
drafting, the United States has not ratified many human rights trea-
ties. 3G1 Ratification of the major international treaties currently ac-
cepted by most other nations would be a meaningful step.362 Payment 
of the over one billion dollars owed to the United Nations would also 
the Establishment of an International Oiminal COllrt, 92 N.1.j. INT'L 1. 548 (1998); Thomas Meron, 
War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 N.1.j. INT'L 1. 462 (1998). 
309 See generally Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States COllrts, 81 CORNELL 1. 
REV. 4, 65 (1995) ("The provincialism of U.S. courts does harm, sometimes serious harm, to 
litigants, to the courts themselves, to the United States, to international lall', and to the rule of 
law."); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims 
Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE j. INT'L 1. 65 (1995) (discussing new possibilities 
and ongoing difficulties of raising human rights claims in U.S. courts). 
~fiO Hoffman, supra note 278, at 184. 
361 These include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, sllpra 
note 204, at 49; the American Com'ention on Human Rights, supra note 206; the COlHlention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against nomen, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th 
Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46; the Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA. 
Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR Annex, Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989). The United 
States has neither signed nor ratified the Com'ention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150; the optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); the Second 
Optional Protocol to the International Covmant all Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition 
of the death penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. 
Doc. A/44/49 (1989); the Inter-American Convention to Pre,'ent and Punish Torture, 25 I.L.M. 
519, Dec. 9, 1985; or the Inter-American Convention on the Pre,'ention, Punishment and Eradi-
cation of Violence Against Women, 27 U.S.T. 3301; see also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of the 
Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricher, 89 N.1. j. INT'L L. 341 (1995). 
362 See generally Dettev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Smiousl)" 92 N.1. j. INT'L 1. 458 (1998) 
(noting the "alarming exacerbation" of the "tendency of the United States not to gi\'e its treaty 
obligations the weight they deser\'e[] "). 
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signal an increased respect for international institutions.3ti3 The United 
States could begin to comply with the judgments of international 
bodies such as the International Court of Justice and the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights. Congress could enact legislation 
that provides real compensation for Japanese Latin Americans and 
other victims of human rights abuses. Collectively, these acts would 
convey the message that the United States is taking international law 
seriously. 
In and of themselves, these measures will not be enough to ensure 
that U.S. authorities actually comply with international law. That will 
require structural changes, including extensive education about evolv-
ing aspects of international law and the assignment of specific respon-
sibility for compliance within the Departments of Defense, State and 
Justice. Internal systems need to be created which will identify interna-
tional law issues when they arise, initiating a process that includes 
investigation of the relevant law, an assessment of the effects of com-
pliance or noncompliance, and conscious decisionmaking based on 
that information. 3tH At this point, there may not be a consensus on the 
extent to which the United States should participate in a world order 
defined by international agreements rather than the exertion of na-
tional power. Nonetheless, the presumption should be that the United 
States intends to comply with international law. To the extent that it 
does not do so, consensus surely exists that the United States govern-
ment should not violate international law, either by accident or delib-
erately, without careful consideration of the costs involved, including 
the harm done to individuals and other countries, the immediate 
self-interest of the United States and damage to the United States' 
reputation and to the development of international law. 
CONCLUSION 
Our position in the post-war world is so vital to the future that 
our smallest actions have far-reaching effects . ... We cannot 
36:1 See Emilio J. Cardenas, Financing the United Nations' Activities: A j'Hatter of Commitment, 
1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 147, 151-52; John Norton Moore, Toward a New Paradigm: Enhanced 
Effectiveness in United Nations Peacekeeping, Collective Security, and War Avoidance, 37 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 811, 878-80 (1997); The United States as Deadbeat: Debt to [T.N. Should Be Paid In Full; The 
Nation's Honor is at Stake, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1997, at B6. 
36. Harold Koh's evaluation of the Clinton Administration's human rights record provides a 
good model for this process by reviewing (1) the Administration's rhetoric; (2) appointments 
made to key policy-making positions; (3) interventions to prevent ongoing human rights abuses; 
(4) accountability in seeking remedies for past abuses; and (5) preventive measures taken, "for 
example, adopting international standards and treaties, promoting institutional change, and 
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escape the fact that our civil rights record has been an issue in 
world politics. The world's pn!ss and radio are full of it .... Those 
with competing ph ilosoj)hies ... have tried to jJrove our democracy 
an empty fraud, and our nation a consistent oppressor of under-
privileged people. This may seem ludicrous to A mericans, but it is 
sufficiently important to worry our friends. The United States is 
not so strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so 
inevitable that we can ignore what the world thinks of us or our 
record. 
-Report oj Pres. Truman's Committee on Civil Rights, 1948 31;5 
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This Article has used the Japanese Peruvian internment as a 
case study of the consideration given to international law in the mak-
ing of U.S. foreign policy, and the costs and consequences of ignor-
ing, or refusing to enforce, international law. The harm caused to 
the thousands of interned Japanese Latin Americans, their families 
and their communities was the result of the United States' willing-
ness to disregard well-established international law prohibiting the 
kidnapping and forced deportation of civilians, the holding of hos-
tages, their indefinite internment without charge or hearing and 
their forced repatriation and/or deportation at the end of the war. 
The internment of Japanese Latin Americans was allowed to happen, 
over some objections from the Justice Department, but with very little 
resistance from U.S. authorities, unreported to the general public, 
and without triggering any subsequent intra-governmental review re-
vealing the flawed nature of the program as a whole. This illus-
trates how important it is to create an oversight system designed to 
assure congruence between American foreign policy and interna-
tionallaw. 
Had the executive branch, through the President and the Cabinet 
officials, made international law a priority and then communicated this 
policy to each department and the agencies thereunder; had Congress 
enacted legislation to enforce international law; or had federal courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court, incorporated international law into 
their decisions, this situation could have been avoided altogether. What 
President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights said just after World 
War II is still true. We cannot afford to let incidents such as the 
Japanese Latin American internment go unremedied, for they commu-
taking measures of deterrence." Harold Hongju Koh, Democrac), and Human Rights, slljnn note 
355, at 192-93. 
365 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1492,PRESEr.;T, at 440 (1995) 
(quoting Report of Committee on Civil Rights). 
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nicate a disdain for international law that will have far-reaching effects 
on the protection of human rights and the furtherance of a world 
order that complies with international law. 
